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ABSTRACT 
THREE ESSAYS IN LABOR ECONOMICS 
 
by 
 
Benjamin Van Kammen 
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Under the Supervision of Professors Scott J. Adams and Scott Drewianka 
 
 
 
There are three chapters in this dissertation, each of which consists of a journal-length 
article.  They are on the following subjects. 
 
The first chapter uses ordinances in San Francisco and Washington, D.C. to measure the 
effects of mandated paid sick leave on employment and wages.  Using the Quarterly 
Census of Employment and Wages, an employment increase is observed in San Francisco 
and Washington, D.C. relative to places without an ordinance.  This evidence suggests 
that sick leave mandates correct a market failure of under-provision of benefits. 
 
The second chapter uses a novel measure of distance based on the O*Net Content Model 
to show that information revealed by the spouses’ occupations predicts divorce.  Spouses 
that are closer in terms of their occupations’ requisite knowledge are more likely to 
divorce, supporting the hypothesis that gains from specialization in a household renders a 
marriage more durable.  Dissimilar spouses in terms of their occupations’ activities are 
more likely to divorce,  suggesting that each spouse brings an inclination toward certain 
activities to the marriage that reflects compatible preferences for joint consumption of 
household public goods. 
ii 
 
 The third chapter measures intertemporal earnings correlation across occupations in the 
U.S. using the Current Population Survey, 1971-2012.  Then predictors of occupational 
earnings correlation are identified from among measures of occupational dissimilarity 
based on the O*Net database.  Its findings consist of several surprisingly positive and U-
shaped relationships between distance measures and measures of earnings correlation, as 
well as distance measures with negative estimated effects on earnings correlation.  
iii 
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Sick Leave Mandates and Employment
1
1.  Introduction 
The most convincing argument in favor of paid sick leave mandates asserts that 
they correct a negative public health externality by encouraging contagiously ill workers 
to quarantine themselves at home.  These merits are significant enough that most (at least 
145) nations in the world have mandated sick leave laws (Heymann, Earle and Hayes 
2007) with varying levels of generosity.  The United States does not have one, 
presumably judging that employers would provide paid sick leave voluntarily to 
employees that value it.  This reflects the concept of paid sick leave as a non-wage 
employment benefit that is transacted in an implicit market along with other job 
amenities.  Equilibrium in this market could exhibit the optimal level of sick leave 
provision—in which case mandating a different level would likely harm employment. 
Alternatively firms may under-provide sick leave if it has external benefits that 
are not internalized.  It is obvious that co-workers contribute to good overall workplace 
health when they stay home with contagious illnesses.  Firms have an interest in 
resolving this externality by paying sick workers to stay home; it limits the spread of 
viruses, infectious diseases, and productivity losses among co-workers—and by doing so, 
maximizes profits.   A health externality does not need to be confined to co-workers at 
the same firm, though.  Since firms have no incentive to internalize other firms’ 
employees’ spillover benefits, under-provision of paid sick leave follows if health 
externalities extend beyond individual firms.  Policy makers in most other countries, as 
well as an increasing number of states and municipalities in the United States, believe 
that sick days are under-provided for this reason and that government mandates are 
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necessary to resolve the problem.  If that is the case, a mandate would pull more 
individuals into the labor force and increase employment. 
This paper measures the employment effects of local paid sick leave mandates by 
employing a differences in differences (hereafter DD) strategy.  Many researchers, e.g., 
Card and Krueger (1994), Klerman and Leibowitz (1997) and Ruhm (1998), Baker and 
Milligan (2008) have used DD to analyze similar policies.  I compare the outcomes of 
two U.S. localities (San Francisco and Washington, D.C.) that have enacted local 
ordinances mandating paid sick leave to places that did not do so.  My estimates indicate 
about a 1 to 3 percent increase in employment in San Francisco and Washington, D.C., 
after mandating sick leave, relative to the control group.  Turning to wages, the evidence 
is mixed between positive and negative effects.  Analysis of industries within each 
county, however, endorses the positive wage effect estimates (and positive employment, 
too) and shows that the benefits of the law primarily go to industries that already 
provided paid leave.  Together these results indicate that mandated paid sick leave, 
indeed, corrects a market failure.  From among the hypotheses for why it increases both 
employment and wages, a particular version of the canonical theory emerges that 
uniquely explains all four findings.  This states that all firms receive a health benefit from 
the mandate, which covers the costs of compliance for the affected firms and 
unambiguously benefits unaffected firms. 
Section 2 of this paper summarizes the relevant preceding literature on benefits 
mandates.  It also espouses the theoretical effects of mandating employee benefits.  
Section 3 describes the data and methods that are used to test for the effects of a paid sick 
leave mandate.  Section 4 conveys the results of the methods used for this endeavor, and 
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Section 5 summarizes the conclusions drawn from those results.  Throughout the paper I 
use “paid sick days” and “paid sick leave” interchangeably.  Though some international 
statues make a distinction between the terms based on the length of the absence, I refer to 
all illness-related paid time off as “leave”. 
Table 1:  Local paid sick leave mandates. 
City Basic Rate and Maximum 
Alternative Rate(s) 
and Maximum(s) Relevant Dates 
San Francisco 1/30, 
maximum 72 
hours 
Maximum 40 hours if firm 
size < 11 employees  
Proposed 8/2006 
Passed 11/2006 
Implemented 2/2007 
Washington, 
D.C. 
1/37, 
maximum 56 
hours 
1/43 and maximum 40 
hours if firm size < 100 
employees 
1/87 and maximum 24 
hours if firm size < 25 
employees 
Proposed 5/2007 
Passed 3/2008 
Implemented 
11/2008 
Milwaukee 1/30, 
maximum 72 
hours 
Maximum 40 hours if firm 
size < 11 employees  
Proposed 7/2008 
Passed 7/2008 
Overturned in State 
court 2011 
Seattle 1/30, 
maximum 72 
hours 
1/40 and maximum 56 
hours if firm size < 250 
employees, maximum 40 
hours if firm size < 50 
employees 
Proposed 6/2011 
Passed 9/2011 
Implemented 9/2012 
All four places have passed a paid sick leave ordinance that applies to private employees in the city or 
district.  Ordinances are used to establish the treatment group and the dates of treatment in my sample.  
“1/x” translates into 1 hour of paid sick leave earned for each x hours worked.  Current information on 
proposals can be found at www.paidsickdays.org. 
 
2.  Background, Literature Review, and Discussion of Theory 
A municipality may pass a law—through a referendum, for example—requiring 
private employers to provide sick leave to their employees at a specific rate (sick leave 
hours per hours worked) and subject to a maximum number of sick days.  Four examples 
of such laws, and an overview of their provisions, are shown in Table 1.  Additionally the 
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Federal government and 18 states have proposed mandated sick leave; four cities (and 
one state) have passed laws and only three have enforced them. 
San Francisco passed the first law of this kind in 2006, and it took effect in 
February of 2007.  Washington, D.C., introduced a law shortly after that, passed it, and 
implemented it in November of 2008.  I consider these places as the treatment group 
because they are the only places to actually enforce mandates.  Since that time, two 
cities—Milwaukee (2008) and Seattle (2011)—and one state, Connecticut (2011), have 
passed sick leave mandates.  Seattle has recently enacted a mandate, but not enough time 
has elapsed to observe its effects in the QCEW.  In fact none of these more recent 
mandates has been in place sufficiently to use its observations to identify treatment 
effects.  Milwaukee and Seattle are useful places for selecting the control group, though.  
They are particularly good control observations since they proceeded nearly as far 
through the legislative process as the treatment places did.  I discuss further how 
Milwaukee and Seattle are used in the sample selection section. 
Presently consider what one should expect to find when looking at the data.  The 
key theoretical forebear of this topic is Summers’s (1989) “Simple Economics of 
Mandated Benefits”, which allows for three possible effects on employment.  First if 
employees value a mandated benefit equal to its cost, employees will effectively pay for 
it by accepting reduced wages at the identical level of employment.  Second mandating a 
worthless benefit has the same effect as a tax on labor—shifting labor demand downward 
by the cost of the benefit without an off-setting shift in supply.  A final possibility is 
mandating a benefit that is more valuable to employees than it costs—which increases 
employment. 
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Mitchell (1990) discusses other considerations in the same vein as Summers’s, 
suggesting the possibility of substituting mandated benefits for other benefits.  Her paper 
additionally contains a useful summary of previous estimation techniques for measuring 
wage-benefit substitutability.  Mitchell also recognizes that a mandate affects the relative 
prices of labor in addition to the input price level that firms face.  Low-skilled workers 
are more likely to be affected by a benefits mandate because they are less likely to 
receive fringe benefits voluntarily.  Requiring employers to provide benefits to all 
employees does nothing for the employees that already receive said benefits but increases 
the costs of employing low-skilled workers.  So substitution among inputs (away from 
low-skilled workers) might mitigate a mandate’s disemployment effect.  More on the 
wage-benefit substitution mechanism can be found in Woodbury (1983), Feldman (1993),  
Simon (2001), Olson (2002), and Marks (2011).  Studies on specific groups like low-
wage workers (Lee and Warren (1999) and Sherstyuk, Wachsman and Russo (2007)), and 
teens (Kaestner 1996) are also available, and the most common mandated benefit they 
examine is health insurance. 
The evidence in this paper from San Francisco and Washington, D.C., is 
consistent with the second “Simple” scenario, however, I hypothesize that the costs of 
complying with the law are offset by its positive effect on employee health and 
productivity.  As noted by Summers (178), using the example of health insurance, this 
may occur if employees’ good health has externalities that firms have no interest in 
resolving.  For example, good health may spill over to employees at different firms.  As 
with a standard positive externality, paid sick leave is under-provided if its benefits 
transcend the buyer and seller.  Then correcting the failure attracts people to the labor 
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force—those at the margin in terms of their preferred mix of wage and benefits.  If the 
mandated level of sick leave is chosen wisely, this explains why one should expect a 
positive employment effect. 
Adverse selection could further explain the under-provision of sick leave.  
Specifically a mandate can have net positive employment effects if it corrects an 
information asymmetry—an idea proposed by Aghion and Hermalin (1990).  Perhaps 
firms expect that being part of the subset of employers offering paid sick leave will 
attract unusually sickly applicants.  But if all employers must offer sick leave by law, the 
sickly population diffuses among employers according to mutual benefit instead of 
pooling by the ones that offer leave voluntarily.  In this manner, a sick leave mandate 
“destroys the choice” as well as the market failure. 
On the empirical side of the topic, a survey of the value of sick leave can be found 
in Earle and Heymann (2006).  One estimate of presenteeism costs comes from Goetzel, 
et al. (2004).  Some of those authors’ larger estimates suggest that on a per worker per 
year basis, illnesses result in $100 to $400 of lost productivity (407).  But many 
conditions studied in that paper are chronic illnesses that are unlikely to improve with a 
sick leave allowance.  Lovell’s (2004) treatment is more of a cost-benefit analysis, but a 
precise estimate (measured in GDP or worker-days) of the public health benefit is absent.  
Even if the mandate harmed labor market efficiency, overall public health benefits are 
potentially great enough to offset those costs and make this a beneficial policy. 
In terms of methodology and subject, the four papers that are most similar to this 
one are:  Ruhm’s (1998) study of parental leave mandates in European countries, 
Klerman and Leibowitz’s (1997) study of maternity leave mandates in 12 American 
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states between 1987 and 1993, Ziebarth and Karlsson’s (2010) study of changes to sick 
leave mandates in Germany during 1996-97, and Petro’s (2010) case study of the San 
Francisco sick leave ordinance. 
The first two papers rely on DD as well as “differences in differences in 
differences” since they also exploit differences between males’ and females’ uses of 
parental leave (Ruhm) and between new mothers and mothers of older children (Klerman 
and Leibowitz) to measure the policies’ effects.  Petro does a less formal version of this, 
focusing on small firms and the retail and food service industries.  All four papers use 
DD methods in which a group is treated with a change to its mandated level of leave, and 
that group is compared to another that is untreated.   
Ziebarth and Karlsson emphasize labor costs more than employment levels and 
find significant decreases in the utilization of sick days under the less generous mandate.  
Ruhm’s results indicate that mandated parental leave increases female EP ratio by 1.3 to 
1.8 percentage points.  Klerman and Leibowitz conclude that maternal leave statutes have 
a negligible effect on female employment.  Petro’s conclusion is that employment grew 
relatively rapidly in San Francisco county compared to five neighboring counties—and 
that the growth rate of business establishments (large and small) in San Francisco 
outpaced neighboring counties during the period following the leave mandate. 
My application of DD relies on geographical comparisons over time, but 
predictions about the effect can be extended to particular industries.  For example, 
disemployment is more likely if employees cannot pay for the mandated benefit because 
of a minimum wage.  Marks (2011) and Simon and Kaestner (2004) analyze the effects of 
minimum wage increases on provision of fringe benefits, hypothesizing that they could 
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be a buffer against disemployment; the reverse of this process could occur with mandated 
benefits.  More directly the effect of the mandate should differ between industries that 
already give most employees paid leave, i.e., where the law is loosely binding, and those 
that don’t.  Three forces are at work:  the cost of complying with a sick leave mandate, 
the value of sick leave to employees that get it as a result of the mandate, and the positive 
health externality.  Firms in industries without ex ante sick leave provision would 
potentially experience all three; firms with sick leave already would experience only the 
externality.  This predicts that industries with abundant paid sick leave prior to the 
mandate move up the supply curve as a result of the law and experience higher wages 
(productivity) and employment.  Industries without much pre-mandate paid sick leave 
could experience employment and wages increases or decreases depending on the 
magnitudes of the three forces.  Namely the externality and employees’ valuation of paid 
leave tend to increase employment; the cost of compliance tends to decrease 
employment; the cost and employees’ valuation tend to decrease wages, and the 
externality tends to increase wages.  This paper tests these predictions as well. 
National Compensation Survey (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2010) tables provide 
statistics on the prevalence of paid sick leave by industry, using the NAICS 2 digit 
classification.  These differences are useful for testing whether industries experience the 
effect of mandated paid leave differently on the basis of pre-mandate prevalence of sick 
leave.  Together these tests and the county-wide employment effect illuminate the effect 
of mandated sick leave even more clearly. 
Finally the mandate’s effect on county-level wages is a combination of the 
positive effect on industries with ex ante sick leave and the (likely non-positive) effect on 
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industries without ex ante sick leave.  My measurement of this was preceded by 
Markussen’s (2011) study of Norwegian individuals using matched employee-physician 
data and instrumental variables methods.  Markussen finds that spells of sick leave have a 
negative relationship with lagged measures of earnings.  Another of his papers (2010) 
endeavors to uncover the optimal wage replacement rate for employees on sick leave.  
This is not interpreted as an estimate of sick leave’s compensating wage differential, 
though, since Norwegian workers have social insurance that provides 52 weeks of paid 
leave.  Instead sick leave’s wage effects are interpreted as depreciated human capital and 
signals of productivity.  As evidence that the San Francisco law improved public health, 
my findings are preceded by Drago and Lovell (2011) who, in employee surveys, found 
reductions in the prevalence of sick workers and of sick children attending school. 
 
3.  Methods and Data 
A.  Main Estimation Model 
I use panel data to estimate the following model: (1) 𝑌𝑖𝑡  = α + α𝑖 + α𝑡 + 𝛽𝑆𝐼𝐶𝐾𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 + γ𝑖𝑡 + δ′X𝑖𝑡 + ε𝑖𝑡 . 
In the model, “i” indexes counties and “t” indexes months.  “Y” is the natural logarithm 
of employment in county “i” in month “t”.  In the subsequent regression measuring the 
wage effect, “Y” is the log average weekly real wage in county “i”, month “t”.  I include 
county and time (year and calendar month) fixed effects, represented by α𝑖 and α𝑡, 
respectively.  “X” is a vector of control variables:  log of population, log of government 
employment, minimum wage, and population growth variables.  SICKMANDATE is an 
indicator for whether a mandate is or has been enacted.  “𝛽” is the effect of the mandate. 
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A less restrictive—but less transparent—version of (1) allows 𝛽 to change 
depending on time elapsed since the law’s enactment.  For instance 𝛽0 is the effect of the 
legislation going into effect; each quarter thereafter an additional indicator switches on 
(with coefficient 𝛽𝑗).  The sum (∑𝛽𝑗) is then the effect of interest and has the 
interpretation:  change in employment beginning from enactment until the end of the 
sample (see McCrary (2007, 330-331)).  No mandate has been repealed so far, so the 
SICK indicators stay on once turned on.  This sum of coefficients (including lags) 
estimates how the employment effect accumulates as time passes.  This methodology 
follows McCrary (2007)—particularly for the interpretation of coefficients (also see 
Wolfers (2006) and Jacobson, Lalonde and Sullivan (1993)).  The alternative 
specification used for the charts (Figure 2) allows beta to change depending on the 
number of quarters elapsed since the mandate took effect.  This is the “dynamic” 
specification:   (2) 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + �𝛽𝑗𝑆𝐼𝐶𝐾𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡,𝑗
𝑗
+ 𝛾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿′𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡. 
I present examples of both specifications in the main results (Tables 3-5). 
The empirical challenge is that county fixed effects likely bias the estimate of 𝛽 in 
a cross section.  Performing the fixed effects transformation subtracts time invariant 
county effects, including time invariant indicators for being in the treatment group, and 
yields an unbiased estimate of 𝛽 with panel data.  An addition to the robustness of the 
estimates is that the residuals are clustered when computing the standard errors—a 
technique proposed by Arellano (1987).  This addresses the effects of arbitrary 
correlation among observations of the same place.  All the standard errors presented from 
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estimates of employment and wage in this paper are of the cluster (by county or by 
industry-county where applicable) robust variety. 
 
B.  Industry Analysis 
 To reinforce the county estimates, I estimate a model at the industry-county level.  
This enables me to interact the treatment variables with measures of each industry’s 
proportion of workers affected by the mandate.  Specifically I estimate the following: (3) 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛼𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐼𝐶𝐾𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝐶𝐾𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 ∗ Pr(𝑈𝑛𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑)𝑗 + 𝛾𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿′𝑋𝑖𝑡  +  𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡. 
Y is the log of employment (subsequently of average wage) in industry “j” in county “i” 
in month “t”.  The mandate indicator is defined as before, but in this model it is interacted 
with industry characteristics—the “𝑃𝑟(𝑈𝑛𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑)𝑗” variable. 
By “unaffected” I refer to the likelihood that workers in that industry  receive sick 
leave voluntarily.  Operationally I use NCS statistics and Quarterly Census of 
Employment and Wages (Bureau of Labor Statistics) data to identify the 2-digit 
industries according to proportion of workers with voluntary paid sick leave.  For the 
industry analysis, I test the coefficients on SICKMANDATE (𝛽1), the effect on an 
(hypothetical) industry with no pre-mandate (voluntary) sick leave, and on the sum of it 
along with the interaction term (𝛽1 + 𝛽2), the effect on an industry with universal pre-
mandate sick leave. 
One should expect, if the theory about public health externalities is correct, that 
industries with universal sick leave (𝑃𝑟(𝑈𝑛𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑)𝑗 = 1) in the treatment counties 
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should experience no wage-fringe trade as a result of the mandate, but they would 
notionally still get positive (productivity-enhancing) health externalities.  Thus the theory 
predicts they will have unambiguously higher wages and employment post-mandate.  An 
industry with universal non-provision of sick leave (𝑃𝑟(𝑈𝑛𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑)𝑗 = 0) would also 
experience the health externality (if anything, even more intensely) and the wage-fringe 
trade as well.  Thus they are predicted to experience an ambiguous employment effect 
and an unambiguously negative wage effect—unless the public health externality is so 
large that it swamps both of the shifts described by Summers. 
 
C.  Data 
Data on employment and wages are available from the QCEW, compiled by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics.  The QCEW contains the number of workers in each county, 
disaggregated by NAICS industry.  Employment is observed on a monthly basis, so the 
data set consists of month-county observations.  Average weekly wage (again per county) 
is observed each quarter and can also be tabulated by industry.  In addition, the QCEW 
reports the number of government employees (local, state, and Federal separately) in each 
county.  Other sources of data for the main estimates come from the U.S. Census (Annual 
Population Estimates) for birth and mortality rates, rates of domestic and international 
migration and the Department of Labor (Minimum Wage Laws in the States).  Minimum 
wage is observed for the state in which county “i” is located and in the year of which 
month “t” is part.  San Francisco has a (higher) local minimum wage and differs from 
other California counties in the sample. 
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As the time span for the sample, I use 2003 to 2009 inclusive.  San Francisco’s 
mandate was proposed in August 2006 and passed in November 2006, so a substantial 
number of periods are observed to establish a pre-treatment trend.  Post-treatment 
observations can be differentiated from one another using lags of the treatment indicator.  
I generated quarterly indicators for lagged implementation to measure the cumulative 
effect of the mandate.  There are 5 lagged indicators, covering 6 quarters including the 
quarter in which the mandate was enacted. 
Table 2:  Means and conditional means of key variables. 
  
All  
Counties 
Treatment 
Counties 
San 
Francisco 
Washington, 
D.C. 
Log Private 
Employment 9.569 13.004 13.016 12.992 
Log Average Weekly 
Real Wage 6.216 6.999 7.029 6.969 
Private Employment 
(Level) 55,786.040 444,620.800 449,992.600 439,249.000 
Average Weekly Real 
Wage (Level) 599.592 1,287.625 1,328.821 1,246.429 
Log Population 10.852 13.411 13.562 13.261 
Log of Federal Gov't 
Employment 5.469 10.920 9.667 12.174 
Log of State Gov't 
Employment 5.497 10.414 10.417 10.410 
Log of Local Gov't 
Employment 7.268 9.524 10.657 8.392 
Births per 1000 
Population 13.102 12.501 11.099 13.902 
Deaths per 1000 
Population 9.714 8.471 7.734 9.209 
Rate of International 
'In' Migration 1.336 5.831 7.693 3.970 
Rate of Domestic 'In' 
Migration 1.248 -8.355 -9.799 -6.910 
Minimum Wage ($) 5.826 7.745 8.711 6.779 
Private employment and wages are the primary dependent variables in this paper; the public sector 
employment, the minimum wage, and demographic variables on this table are used as control variables in 
some specifications.  These are time series averages for the sample, 2003-2009 inclusive.  Employment 
data is from the QCEW; population and growth rates are from the U.S. Census, and minimum wage data 
is from the Department of Labor. 
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Aside from the variables already mentioned, time trends have autonomous effects 
on employment.  All of the economic variables discussed are time-variant; business 
cycles, national population growth, globalization, et al., affect them, and the trends can 
differ across locations.  To capture additional variation over time that might confound the 
interpretation of the estimates, I include calendar-month indicators, and year fixed effects 
(indicators), and two varieties of time trends (alternately)—treatment-specific and 
county-specific.  In the main regression model, 𝛼𝑡 and 𝛾 capture these trends. 
 
D.  Selection of Samples 
There are several ways of choosing a sample of counties for the estimation, and 
each has strengths and drawbacks.  On one end of the continuum, the entire QCEW 
sample is available.  On the other, a systematically matched control group consisting of 
the nearest neighbors (i.e., geographically or on propensity scores) to the treatment places 
presents itself. 
Selecting a control group geographically has been performed in previous studies:  
famously by Card and Krueger (1994) on restaurants on opposite sides of the New 
Jersey-Pennsylvania border and by Petro (2010) to the San Francisco sick days mandate 
(used adjacent counties).  Since the San Francisco and Washington, D.C., mandates were 
both local in scope, a geographical comparison to nearby counties seems unlikely to 
satisfy the requirements that Card’s and Krueger’s design does—which uses state 
legislation that can plausibly be called exogenous to the local labor markets. 
If a control group of neighbors is selected for the present analysis, then, it ought 
to consist of neighbors in terms of propensity to be treated.  This is where other sick leave 
15
mandates campaigns are useful; they reveal willingness to consider laws like San 
Francisco’s and Washington’s.  I have used the other places that have proposed sick leave 
mandates:  Milwaukee, Seattle, Philadelphia, New York, Portland (OR), Miami, and 
Orange County, FL (National Partnership for Women and Families 2013), several states, 
to select a control group for the sample using propensity scores as a check of the 
robustness of the findings, but the main results in this paper do not rely on a selected 
control group.   
The main results in this paper use all counties in the QCEW, regression DD, and 
fixed effects estimation to resolve the correlation between SICKMANDATE and county 
fixed effects.  This method relies on the treatment and controls having common time 
trends.  I control for this with (alternately) treatment-specific and county-specific time 
trends (𝛾𝑖𝑡). 
 
4.  Estimation Results 
A.  Main Results 
 An increase in employment accompanies paid sick leave mandates and has a 
magnitude of 1 to 4 percent.  This effect is comparable and same-signed whether I use 
treatment-specific or county-specific time trends.  Accounting for idiosyncratic time 
trends is clearly important; the most restrictive specifications, i.e., assuming (or limiting 
counties to) a common trend, yields the largest estimates.  The less restrictive county time 
trends tend to produce more conservative estimates.  These estimates change little with 
the inclusion of control variables such as the public sector employment, birth rate, 
mortality rate, in migration rates, and the minimum wage level, as Table 3 shows.  The 
16
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estimates are all precise enough to reject a zero effect at 99% confidence, except for the 
dynamic specification of the treatment effect using county time trends.  Even that point 
estimate (column 8) is consistent with the others in the set, though. 
A particularly clear effect of mandated sick leave appears when I identify it from 
San Francisco County compared to other sample counties in California (Table 4).  Some 
of the specifications in this set are larger than those that used the full sample, but the ones 
that use the least restrictive (county-specific) time trends tend toward the lower end of the 
scale.  A negative effect can be rejected with high confidence, though, in all except one 
specification (again dynamic effects and county time trends).  A 95% confidence interval 
for San Francisco’s mandate’s effect ranges from 1 to 8 tenths of a point, so it is possible 
that the effect is smaller than 1 percent.  These conclusions are based on specification 4 
on Table 4, using the following counties with large populations:  Los Angeles, San 
Diego, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, Santa Clara, Alameda, Sacramento, Contra 
Costa, Fresno, Kern, Ventura, San Francisco, San Mateo, San Joaquin, Stanislaus.  This 
set of estimates is particularly tidy because it excludes the national capital from the 
analysis, along with its unique connection to the Federal government. 
  To compare this to the Petro (2010) finding, his data indicate that San Francisco 
County’s employment increased 4.7% during the same period and that employment in the 
five counties surrounding San Francisco decreased 2.5%.  Petro’s finding is that 
employment growth in San Francisco was 7.2 percentage points higher than neighboring 
counties, but the failure to account for both population growth and time trends limits 
what can be causally attributable to the sick leave policy.  My estimates, which do allow 
for causal interpretation, indicate that San Francisco’s paid sick leave mandate did lead 
19
the employment level to grow compared to the control counties, but by a smaller 
magnitude:  between ½ and 2 percent. 
My estimates using the log of county average wage as the outcome support a 
version of Summers’s model’s prediction.  Some of them, using industry-specific and 
treatment-specific time trends, show that wages are negatively (employees pay for the 
benefit) impacted by mandated sick leave, which I report on Tables 5a (all counties) and 
5b (California).  Most of these negative estimates come from the specifications that use a 
time trend for the treatments and a common time trend for all other counties, and they 
range up to 7 or 8 percent in some cases. The estimates that add county-specific time 
trends are, again, more moderate and negative or (Table 5a, columns 5 and 6) positive!  
Table 5b shows this on columns 4 and 8, as well. 
A wage increase is not, by itself, a rejection of the mandated benefits theory, but it 
does require an additional restriction on the basic hypothesis that a public health 
externality justifies the mandate:  labor supply does not respond to the mandate.  The next 
sub-section makes this more explicit, but employment and wages can both increase if the 
increase comes from movement up the supply curve by firms that already offered paid 
sick leave and firms that did not offer sick leave do not counteract it.  Naturally there are 
other explanations for this finding, too, which I discuss in section 5.  But none of the 
other explanations is supported by my industry analysis findings. 
That paid sick leave mandates are positively related to employment—moreover 
that they are not negatively related—is the main finding of this paper.  It is observed 
using many different specifications and samples.  The remaining results in the paper 
20
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attempt to identify the specific mechanism through which this occurs using the policy’s 
effects on individual industries. 
B.  Industry Analysis 
It is possible to distinguish among industries according to the fraction of their 
workers that receives paid sick leave voluntarily.  As I alluded in sub-section 4A, looking 
at industries can inform whether the positive or the negative wage effect should be 
favored and how positive employment and wage effects can be explained in the county 
model.  I test among four (listed in section 5) hypotheses using industry level (QCEW) 
data and statistics from the NCS.  My results support a version of the canonical mandated 
benefits theory in which the mandate is individually costly to firms that don’t already 
offer the benefit, employees do not respond by increasing labor supply, and individual 
costs are offset by the public health externality.  I reach this conclusion from estimating 
the coefficients 𝛽1and 𝛽2 in the industry equation (3) with the expectation that 𝛽1 
represent the effect on an industry with no pre-mandate paid sick leave, and the linear 
combination, 𝛽1 + 𝛽2, represents the effect on an industry with universal pre-mandate 
paid sick leave.  The dependent variables are logs of employment and wages at the 2 digit 
industry level.  Standard errors in these estimates are clustered on industry-county; 
otherwise the model is the same as previously.  Tables 7a (employment) and 7b (wage) 
compares the growth across industries within the treatment counties. 
The prevalence of paid leave in a particular county is imperfectly correlated with 
the national statistics, so noise in these variables may account for the imprecision in some 
of these specifications.  Columns 1 and 2, for instance, support the standard theory in 
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Table 6:  Industry characteristics. 
Industry 
Proportion 
Voluntary 
Sick Leave 
Proportion 
at or Below 
Minimum 
Wage 
Average 
Employees 
per Firm 
Average 
Weekly 
Wage 
Agriculture, Forestry, 
Fishing and Hunting 0.36 0.042 6.305 0.500 
Mining 0.54 0.065 5.709 2.230 
Utilities 0.93 0.006 51.661 1.018 
Construction 0.36 0.011 11.300 0.987 
Manufacturing 0.61 0.019 22.894 1.062 
Wholesale Trade 0.79 0.029 9.438 1.207 
Retail Trade 0.51 0.073 13.602 0.546 
Transportation and 
Warehousing 0.72 0.017 13.151 0.518 
Information 0.89 0.039 27.599 1.351 
Finance and Insurance 0.92 0.023 20.912 1.885 
Real Estate and Rental 
and Leasing 0.80 0.047 8.946 0.925 
Professional, Scientific, 
and Technical Services 0.83 0.018 12.302 1.480 
Management of 
Companies and 
Enterprises 0.64 0.040 57.553 2.025 
Administrative and 
Support and Waste 
Management and 
Remediation Services 0.40 0.040 26.034 0.585 
Educational Services 0.75 0.042 54.626 0.829 
Health Care and Social 
Assistance 0.78 0.033 24.117 0.832 
Arts, Entertainment, and 
Recreation 0.64 0.103 22.805 0.781 
Accommodation and 
Food Services 0.29 0.256 21.648 0.371 
Other Services (except 
Public Administration) 0.53 0.088 4.977 0.663 
All Industries Pooled 0.62 0.065 13.571 1.000 
Statistics on voluntary leave and proportion at or below the minimum wage come from the 2010 March 
NCS.  Consequently they are national averages that are not necessarily precise for each county in the 
sample.   
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which employees in industries bound by the law “pay for” sick leave with lower wages, 
and their willingness to do so exceeds the costs of providing them paid leave (evidenced 
by the positive employment effect).  This is consistent with the negative county-level 
wage effect estimates.  Unfortunately, despite point estimates that support this 
hypothesis, they are too imprecise to reject the null with high confidence. 
That is not the case with columns 3 and 4, which feature a less restrictive 
(industry and county-specific) allowance for time trend heterogeneity.  There is neither 
an employment nor a wage effect on the industries bound by the law, but there are 
positive employment (almost 2.5%) and wage effects (about 1%) on industries that 
already provided paid sick leave.  So the estimates that are precise enough to sign the 
effects reveal that only the “unaffected” industries benefit from the law, i.e., positive 
employment and wage effects are observed for industries that already have paid sick 
leave and no such effects are observed for industries without it.  This evidence points to a 
more specific version of mandated benefits theory:  the law has a positive health 
externality, but the non-effects on industries most severely bound by the law would 
require that labor supply not shift out in response to the mandate. 
Specifically a 2.4% employment increase and a 0.9 to 1.0% wage increase are 
observed for the hypothetical industry with universal pre-mandate sick leave.  Conversely 
the effect is (statistically and practically) insignificantly different from zero on both 
variables for the hypothetical industry with no pre-mandate sick leave.  Together with the 
results of the county model, this supports the positive county employment and wage 
effect and illuminates the reasons both effects occur.  Paid sick leave mandates confer a 
public health benefit on all workers by inducing the reluctant workers and firms to utilize 
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Table 7a and 7b:  Industry characteristics’ effects on employment and wage growth. 
Effect on Log Industry Employment 
1 2 3 4 
Mandate Implemented (β1) 0.2912 0.2926 -0.0069 -0.0070 
(.1904) (.1903) (.0106) (.0106) 
Implied % Change Employment - - - - 
Mandate*Unaffected (β2) -0.2136 -0.2166 0.0306** 0.0305** 
(.1779) (.1776) (.0142) (.0142) 
Mandate, Unaffected Industry (β1+β2) 0.0776 0.0760 0.0237*** 0.0235*** 
(.0564) (.056) (.006) (.006) 
Implied % Change Employment - - 2.40% 2.37% 
Observations 2,778,552 2,778,552 2,745,474 2,745,474 
Panels 33,078 33,078 33,078 33,078 
Year, Calendar Month Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Population All Population All 
Time Trends 
Industry, 
Treatment 
& Control 
Industry, 
Treatment 
& Control 
Industry, 
County 
Industry, 
County 
Dynamic Treatment Effect No No No No 
Effect on Log Industry Average Wage 
1 2 3 4 
Mandate Implemented (β1) -0.0345 -0.0327 0.0040 0.0043 
(.0232) (.0235) (.0048) (.0047) 
Implied % Change Wages - - - - 
Mandate*Unaffected (β2) 0.0214 0.0199 .0052 0.0051 
(.0355) (.0359) (.007) (.0069) 
Mandate, Unaffected Industry (β1+β2) -0.0130 -0.0129 .0092*** .0094*** 
(.0184) (.0184) (.0027) (.0026) 
Implied % Change Wages - - 0.93% 0.94% 
Observations 2,778,549 2,778,549 2,745,470 2,745,470 
Panels 33,078 33,078 33,078 33,078 
Year, Calendar Month Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls None All None All 
Time Trends 
Industry, 
Treatment 
& Control 
Industry, 
Treatment 
& Control 
Industry, 
County 
Industry, 
County 
Dynamic Treatment Effect No No No No 
Estimates of model (3) using industry data.  The panels are (2 digit) industry, county 
combinations.  Again standard errors are cluster robust around each panel (county-industry). 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
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sick days.  This is costly to the reluctant firms, but the costs are offset by the public 
health externality; exposure to fewer sick workers from other firms makes their workers 
healthier and more productive.  Firms that already offered paid sick leave receive the 
benefit without incurring costs and move up the supply curve resulting in higher 
employment and wages. 
Figure 1:  Industry effects of mandated benefit with positive externality, without supply response. 
The panel on the left shows the effect on an (hypothetical) industry without paid sick leave prior to the 
mandate.  As in the canonical model, the cost of complying with the law shifts demand inward, but the 
costs are offset by the productivity-enhancing effects of the health externality, shifting it outward and 
resulting in an insignificant effect.  The right panel shows the effect on an (hypothetical) industry with 
universal paid sick leave prior to the mandate.  It experiences no costs of complying with the law but still 
receives the health externality, shifting demand outward and resulting in positive employment and wage 
effects.  I hypothesize that this explains the findings in columns 5 and 6 of Table 4 (positive wage effect at 
county level) and in columns 3 and 4 of Tables 6a and 6b (positive employment and wage effects for 
industry with ex ante paid leave, no effects for industry without ex ante paid leave). 
C.  Robustness Checks 
I have performed numerous variations of this analysis that confirms the primary 
result of the paper:  that paid sick leave mandates increase employment.  Two broad 
categories account for most of them:  different samples and different specifications.  As I 
mentioned in section 3D, selecting a sample on the basis of propensity to be treated is an 
alternative to using control variables on the sample of all counties.  I have estimated the 
model using three different propensity score matched samples to confirm the sign and 
magnitude of the employment effect (see appendix for additional details).  I have also 
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Figure 2a:  Employment effect of paid sick leave mandate over time. 
Figure 2b:  Wage effect of paid sick leave mandate over time. 
These figures chart the linear combinations of the coefficients on several lags of the treatment variable.  
The regression is specified as in the last column of Table 3 and column 7 on Table 5a, respectively.  The 
graph also shows the boundaries of a 95% confidence interval for the effect. 
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estimated the model using private sector EP (employment to population) ratio as the 
dependent variable to confirm the primary results.  I report the results that used the most 
transparent methods and were easiest to interpret in the paper, but the positive 
employment result is a feature of nearly every regression I have run using this data. 
As an indication of the findings using a propensity-matched subset of counties, 
consider model (1) estimated using only San Francisco along with other California 
counties with high propensity scores as the control group:  Alameda, Contra Costa, Los 
Angeles, Riverside, San Bernadino, Sacramento, San Diego, and Fresno.  The estimated 
treatment effect is between (95% confidence interval) 0.4 and 0.8 EP points.  San 
Francisco’s population grew 3.6% between 2006 and 2009.  It can be shown that the 
change in EP divided by the initial level equals:  %𝛥 Employment minus %𝛥 population.  
Some quick calculations suggest that if mandating sick leave increases EP by one point, 
the level of employment increases by roughly 5.4% (initial EP ratio in San Francisco was 
0.568.).  Six tenths of a point of EP increase means that the level rose by roughly 4.7%. 
Most of the wage effect estimates using the propensity score-matched samples are 
modestly negative (about 1% decrease) and follow the same pattern of the full sample:  
modestly positive and significant for the county-specific time trend specifications.  The 
industry analysis also follows the same pattern, confirming that the positive county 
effects originate from industries with ex ante sick leave provision.  Where the county 
wage effect estimates are negative, the industry analysis lacks precision compared to its 
counterpart using the whole sample.  The point estimates do suggest that industries 
without ex ante sick leave account for the lower county-wide wages, but the coefficients 
are not statistically significant. 
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Representatives of the specifications with time-varying effects are illustrated on 
Figure 2.  I hold them up merely as crude evidence that the employment and wage effects 
are concentrated primarily in the immediate wake of the mandate and gradually recede.  
Whether employment or wages recede to their original trends does not appear likely, but 
the gains right after the mandate do not continue perpetually, either.  I emphasize the 
shape of these plots more so than levels and interpret them cautiously.  They seem to 
suggest that the positive (“health externality”) effects occur right away with the costs of 
compliance occurring subsequently as the cumulative effects taper off closer to zero. 
I end this section with a clarification:  to precisely make the “shifting supply and 
demand” interpretation of sick leave mandates, the units of measure for labor should be 
hours—not employment level.  There is no measure in the QCEW of changes in hours 
worked.  Since there is a maximum number of sick hours employees can earn, employers 
may have an incentive to schedule more hours per employee, crossing the threshold 
where they stop earning paid leave.  If firms do this with their leave-mandated 
employees, this tends to moderate the measured effect compared to a case in which 
demand shifts and hours per worker is held constant.  Consequently the possibility of 
changing hours per worker does not contradict the conclusion. 
5. Discussion and Conclusions
My estimates consistently portray a mandated benefit with positive employment 
effects.  The magnitude of this is probably between 1% and 4%, which is a noteworthy 
effect on a local labor market.  While I don’t rule out a negative wage effect—and I have 
estimates that employees pay for mandated sick leave with lower wages (on the order of 
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7 or 8 percent)—a modest positive effect of around 1% is more consistent with the 
industry analysis. Thus the costs of  mandated sick leave are paid for either by employees 
or public health (productivity) gains.  Either way my findings are evidence of a corrected 
market failure.  It is understandable that paid sick leave is underprovided in the absence 
of a mandate.  The external benefits of employees’ health were not appropriately 
internalized prior to the mandates. 
If I take the negative wage (positive employment) estimates to be the right ones, 
Summers’s paper explains them very well, but because the same estimates reveal no 
effect on industries with ex ante sick leave they restrict sick leave’s external benefits to 
the “affected” industries.  This is not difficult to imagine, i.e., that workers primarily 
interact with and affect the health of other workers in the same broad industry, and the 
risk of contagion for someone from another industry on the bus or walking down the 
street is comparatively minor. 
The simple static model strains, however, at explaining a positive effect on both 
outcomes.  Observing positive employment and positive wage effects could be the result 
of one of the following hypotheses:   
1) The simple model holds and the effect of the externalities are so large
that they push equilibrium up the new supply curve beyond the original
wage,
2) The simple model is inadequate at accounting for the preservation of
human capital that results from the laws’ effects on turnover, i.e., it is a
static model that does not account for intertemporal effects; employees
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do pay for sick leave, but gaining it keeps them around longer for their 
productivity and wages to increase beyond their initial levels, 
3) something other than a public health externality, e.g., adverse selection,
explains the findings,
4) The simple model holds, but labor supply does not respond to the laws
(at least not during the time horizon examined) and the health
externality offsets the costs of complying with the laws.
Discerning among these options is possible using the industry analysis.  For instance if 
number 1 holds, the employment gains would be relatively larger for industries in which 
most workers do not have voluntary paid sick leave (supply and demand both increase).  
This is not observed.  Similarly number 2 would require the effect on industries without 
much voluntary sick leave to be positive, as the preserved human capital pushes wages up 
the supply curve over time.  Neither is this observed in the industry analysis.  The 
observed positive employment and wage effect on industries with abundant voluntary 
paid sick leave contradicts adverse selection—resolution of which would entail a flow of 
workers (if anything) out of industries that already had paid sick leave.  Finally, if 
number 4 holds, this would result in positive employment and wage effects for the 
industries with voluntary paid sick leave and no effect on industries without it. 
The results of the industry analysis endorse this last possibility.  Paid sick leave 
mandates increase overall employment, but the effects are concentrated in a subset of 
industries.  Namely industries with widespread voluntary provision of sick leave account 
for most of the growth in employment and wages.  This finding using data on industries 
convinces me that the positive wage effect estimates are most accurate.  The former 
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group’s employment and wages do not change, whereas the latter group’s increase.  So to 
recapitulate, I find that sick leave mandates result in increased employment and wages, 
both originating in industries on which the law is not very binding. 
Critics of sick leave mandates emphasize the mobility of capital as the source of 
their suspicions of negative consequences. My findings show that employers do not 
immediately flee a locality that enacts a mandate.  A longer time span is necessary to see 
if they do eventually.  If capital flight has not proven a severe problem at the local level, 
the policy would have even fewer negative consequences if implemented at a national 
level, at which capital is less mobile.  This is especially true considering the implied 
magnitude of the public health benefit of more paid sick leave. 
The upshot of the paper is that paid sick leave mandates do not appear to be “job-
killing” regulations.  I have found no significant evidence of disemployment from 
mandated paid sick leave.  As I alluded earlier, the ultimate test of the legislation would 
compare labor market efficiency costs and the public health benefits.  My results indicate 
that such a comparison would favor a mandate, since paid sick leave mandates appear to 
have no disemployment effects.  Therefore paid sick leave mandates likely have 
unambiguous net social benefits, and it is increasingly apparent that the U.S. should 
follow other nations that mandate sick leave. 
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Occupational Distance and Marital Stability 
36
“Baby ain’t it somethin’ how we lasted this long; you and me provin’ everyone 
wrong; don’t think we’ll ever get our differences patched; don’t really matter cuz 
we’re perfectly matched.” 
– Paula Abdul and MC Skat Kat
1. Introduction
Previous research finds that the rise of dual-earner households is highly correlated 
with rising divorce rates, with ample evidence supporting causality in both directions 
[e.g., (Johnson and Skinner 1986), (Spitze and South 1985), (Bremmer and Kesselring 
2004), (Ging and Kim 2011)].  Conditional on both spouses working, however, the 
determinants of a successful marriage are complex.  And an expansive literature explores 
marital stability, as well as the related questions of spousal matching and gains from 
marriage.  A complete review is beyond the scope of this paper, but a comprehensive review can 
be found in E. L. Lehrer (2003).  In this paper, we use a novel approach that considers 
information revealed through current and past occupation choices in an empirical model 
of the determinants of a successful marriage, as measured by divorce.  We hypothesize 
that the type of job one chooses, and the relative distance from the spouse’s job in terms 
of job content, reveals much about gains form specialization and relative preferences for 
household goods.  This conjecture is supported by a wide range of research that has 
shown a correlation between underlying individual traits, both cognitive and non-
cognitive, that influence occupational choice (A meta-analysis and review are contained in 
Sheu, et al. (2010)). 
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Although our paper is related to the previous literature on the relative wages and 
schooling of the spouses [e.g., (Lam 1988) and (Liu and Lu 2006)] and their relevance for 
match quality, we eschew rank-order or vertical comparisons of spouses in this paper.  
We instead posit a “horizontal” comparison of spousal characteristics with no necessary 
ordinal significance.  Our variables of interest measure dissimilarity between spouses’ 
occupations on a number of dimensions, which take the form of “distance” measures.  
They act like cartographic distances in that they do not convey which endpoint is at 
higher elevation or latitude.  Consequently, these occupation measures can test theories of 
marital stability that are either based on similarities of preferences for household goods or 
dissimilarities allowing for gains from specialization.  Spousal contrasts can ultimately be 
either good or bad for a marriage, depending upon which dimensions of the occupations 
the distance measures are based. 
Our evidence suggests that there are two dimensions of occupation distance that 
affect marital stability and dissolution.  First, spouses whose occupational information 
reveals dissimilarity in terms of knowledge are less likely to divorce or separate.  The 
knowledge-based distance measures most likely capture what the spouses are able to 
produce within the household given the knowledge that each spouse’s occupation 
requires.  This supports the prediction that households that can divide tasks based on 
comparative advantage will be more stable.  Second, spouses that are dissimilar in terms 
of vocational activities are more likely to divorce.  The activities involved in one’s 
chosen occupation reveal preferences for activities more generally.  To the extent that 
couples share activities and consume household public goods, one’s preferences for 
activities can be more or less compatible with a spouse’s preferences. 
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We extend this analysis to single-earner households.  As with the literature on 
wage sorting among couples, this research must overcome the obstacle of missing data—
namely from spouses that are not earning a wage and have no current occupation from 
which to measure distance.  Our approach overcomes this using longitudinal data 
containing information on individuals’ earlier occupations.  A “synthetic” distance 
predicted from characteristics of the spouses is also used as a robustness check.  
Combining information gleaned from current occupations, earlier occupations, and 
synthetic distances suggests that the information contained in one’s choice of occupation 
is durable in terms of determining marital stability.  Moreover, since these effects are 
robust across these methods, it is defensible that information contained in these 
occupation characteristics are orthogonal to the other factors that might influence the 
labor force participation-marital stability relationship. 
The discussion proceeds as follows.  Section 2 reviews the existing literature on 
marital dissolution, as well as the related literature on spousal matching.  Section 3 
discusses the construction of occupational distance measures.  Section 4 discusses the 
data and methods used in the present examination of marriage and marital dissolution, 
and the empirical results are presented and discussed in Section 5.  Section 6 concludes. 
2. Background and Conceptual Framework
A.  Related Literature on the Strength of Spousal Matches 
The framework for analyzing formation and dissolution of marriage originates 
with Becker (1973, 1974), who describes the household production function with 
members’ time and market goods as inputs.  Becker speculates that the returns to scale of 
the production function are increasing, generating the incentives to marry, and the gains 
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are magnified if one spouse concentrates on wage earning (providing market goods) and 
the other spouse concentrates on direct home production.  Among the many extensions of 
this basic model is Weiss (1997), who relies on credit constraints to explain the same 
sorting mechanism:  the gain from marriage comes from the spouse with lower wage-
earning potential financing human capital investments for the spouse with higher wage-
earning potential.  The high potential spouse could not otherwise invest in this manner 
because of constraints on borrowing against future income.  Weiss (86) shows that this 
gain in future income comes from specialization.  Thus, two spouses with equal earning 
ability do not benefit from marrying one another.  These models imply that the optimal 
pattern for pairing husbands and wives is negative sorting on wages, since it maximizes 
the gains from specialization (see Becker 1973, 826-828). 
Sorting according to labor market productivity need not be the extent of the 
husband-wife matching mechanism.  Mitigating spouses’ earnings risks is another source 
of gains from marriage, but without obvious implications for how spouses sort in terms of 
productivity level.  If each spouse faces uncertainty about the income he or she will earn, 
having another person in the household to insure against idiosyncratic earnings shocks 
makes both spouses’ expected utilities higher.  Naturally, the advantage of such insurance 
is more limited as the correlation of earnings risk between spouses grows.  The 
implication is that dissimilar occupations or industries will more effectively mitigate the 
risk to household consumption from earnings instability.  According to the risk-sharing 
theory, marriages between “dissimilarly employed” spouses generate more gains.  We 
note that dissimilar, here, does not imply an ordinal ranking.  We simply mean that 
diversification of jobs is good in terms of ensuring some income for the household. 
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There are several other reasons to suspect that dissimilar spousal occupations 
affect match strength.  Lich-Tyler (2003) shows how assortative matching is based on 
similar preferences for household public goods in the absence of differences in skills, 
wages, et al.  Weiss and Willis (1997) found the same basic notion holds with respect to 
education.  Specifically the marginal effect of an interaction term between husband’s and 
wife’s education decreases the probability of divorce.  The authors interpret this as the 
result of preference complementarity and shared consumption (316).  From this literature, 
we postulate that preferences for goods correlate with individuals’ choices of occupation.  
Non-wage amenities and disamenities attract individuals to occupations based on their 
valuations of the amenities.  It is reasonable to expect, for example, two people who 
chose to work an outdoor job to also enjoy outdoor leisure activities. 
Regardless of whether preferences and labor market traits are correlated, marriage 
generates gains for the spouses if non-rival household goods are consumed since any 
amount of the good consumed by one partner gives the other partner utility also.  Lam 
(1988) elaborates on this possibility by exploring two consequences of a household 
public good—correlation in preferences for the public good and home production of the 
public good.  The first suggests positive (“outdoor work and outdoor leisure”) sorting of 
spouses, and the second suggests negative (specialization-based) sorting.  The latter 
depends on the public good’s production function and how complementary the spouses’ 
time inputs are in terms of allowing for specialization. 
The novel approach of this paper is to use information on occupations to learn 
more about spousal compatibility.  Given that there is ample evidence from the previous 
literature that both similarities and dissimilarities draw spouses together and make 
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marriages work, we suspect the richness of information about one’s occupation can shed 
light on the role of dissimilarities.   The risk sharing explanations for match quality and 
the idea that dissimilar spouses could more effectively divide tasks in the household 
imply that spouses with proximal occupations reap fewer gains from marriage.  
Alternatively spouses with occupations that are dissimilar could have a disadvantage in 
match quality if the gains from marriage come from preference compatibility, 
complementarity in household public good production, or spillover of human capital 
within the household.  The last idea, suggested by Benham (1974), states that one 
spouse’s earnings are enhanced by the knowledge of the other spouse, assuming that the 
other spouse has relevant knowledge.  This would be relevant when both spouses’ 
occupations are complements in market goods production, e.g., physician and nurse.  A 
marriage involving two such occupations could be expected to make both spouses better 
at doing their individual jobs, thus generating larger gains from marriage. 
B.  Additional Factors Explaining Marital Dissolution 
As with most papers in the literature, our aim is to measure determinants of match 
quality but must use divorce or separation as a proxy.  This relies on the assumption that 
poorer match quality renders divorce more likely.  Spouses gain information during the 
marriage about its quality and the availability of better matches (there may also be some 
“on the job search”).  Since dissolution is costly, minor adverse realizations do not 
compel well-matched spouses to divorce; only marginally-well-matched couples do.  The 
question we ask in this paper then is:  “are couples with more distant occupations more 
likely or less likely to be marginally-well-matched (ceteris paribus)?”  Since we use 
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divorce and separation to reveal marriages that are relatively poor matches, we appeal to 
the existing literature on marital dissolution to identify other factors that are important to 
include in the analysis as controls.  Weiss and Willis (1997) find that shocks to the 
earnings of one spouse affect the probability of divorce.  Such increases to the husband’s 
earnings stabilize the marriage while positive shocks to the wife’s earnings destabilize it.  
We interpret this result as suggesting that an increase to the higher-earning spouse 
stabilizes the marriage, but an increase to the lower-earning spouse destabilizes the 
marriage.  Kalmijn, Loeve and Manting (2007) show that among Dutch couples, the 
stabilizing effect of income growth for the higher earner is confirmed—but only when the 
higher earner is male.  In households in which the dominant earner is female, growth of 
the wife’s relative income has a destabilizing effect on the marriage.  Similarity in the 
levels of the spouses’ schooling at the time of marriage also stabilizes the match, as do 
higher age at marriage, duration, children, and marital assets like property.  Investments 
in human capital after marriage have mixed consequences for marital stability.  They 
increase the earning potential of the household but do so at the expense of household 
production.  Moreover, the additional human capital stock provides the spouse that 
invests more attractive outside options (Johnson and Skinner 1986). 
Demographic variables indicating the spouses’ religious (Charles and Stephens 
2004) homogamy significantly predict a lower probability of divorce.  In some samples 
(Bramlett and Mosher 2002), ethnic homogamy, the wife being older than the husband, 
and successful parental marriages do likewise.  Pre-marital cohabitation and previous 
marriages are positively correlated with divorce probabilities in the Bramlett and Mosher 
CDC report as well as in other samples (Weiss and Willis 1997, 313-15).  Living in an 
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area with high male unemployment, a greater proportion in poverty, a higher proportion 
receiving welfare, and lower median income each predicts higher divorce probability, 
according to the same CDC study, as does the race of the wife.  Lehrer (2008) uses the 
same data (the National Survey of Family Growth) set to confirm that age-at-marriage is 
positively related to stability. 
Job displacement, particularly layoffs (as opposed to plant closures), adversely 
affects marital stability (Charles and Stephens 2004).  This finding has been confirmed 
for unemployment of husbands using Danish data (Jensen and Smith 1990).  
Geographical movement also tends to destabilize marriages because the motive is usually 
a new job for one spouse and this tends to benefit that spouse more than the other (Boyle, 
et al. 2008).  In Norwegian households, receipt of public transfers, particularly through 
the wife, increases the likelihood of divorce (Tjotta and Vaage 2008).  Blackburn (2003) 
finds that this phenomenon is unrelated to the generosity of welfare programs for single 
mothers, i.e., welfare programs for single mothers do not incentivize divorce for women.  
Finally, living in an area with greater availability of other mates increases the probability 
of divorce (South and Lloyd 1995) as does working in an occupation with greater 
availability of other mates (McKinnish 2007).  This literature guides our choice of 
covariates in regressions. 
3. Measuring the Distance Between Any Two Occupations
The innovation in this paper is construction of a measure of occupational distance 
that can be used on pairs of spouses to test various theories of marriage.  The information 
for measuring occupational proximity comes from the O*Net Content Model:  “The 
O*NET database contains several hundred variables that represent descriptors of work 
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and worker characteristics, including skill requirements” (O*Net).   The activities, 
abilities, knowledge and skills files contain the variables we use to measure distance 
between occupations.1  Version 16.0 of the database from O*Net consists of scores, from 
worker and occupational expert questionnaires, assessing the relevance of the various 
activities, abilities, knowledge, and skills to each occupation.2 
Relevance is measured on two (ordinal) scales for each occupational dimension:  
importance (1 to 5) and level (0 to 7).  The importance scale is accompanied by typical 
linear, numeric scale language, such as “not important and “extremely important”.  The 
level scale is accompanied by “anchors” that communicate what constitutes a minimal 
level of performance and what constitutes a sophisticated level.  For example, the anchors 
for ability code, “1.A.2.b.2:  Multi-limb Coordination” are shown below. 
Level 2 Anchor:  “Row a boat” 
Level 4 Anchor:  “Operate a forklift truck in a warehouse” 
Level 6 Anchor:  “Play the drum set in a jazz band” 
The ordinal nature of these data poses a practical problem, and so does the 
existence of two scales per variable.  One might worry that the average of the scores 
among respondents from an occupation is meaningless except in comparison to averages 
for that occupation on other dimensions—or to other occupations’ averages on the same 
dimension.  A couple features of the scores ameliorate this problem, however. 
1 A summary of these is located online:  http://www.onetcenter.org/dl_files/ContentModel_Detailed.pdf. 
2 “An occupation expert is a person who has several years of experience and training in an occupation. He 
or she has the expert knowledge required to respond to questions about the skills, knowledge and activities 
required for work in the occupation” (https://onet.rti.org/faq_oe.cfm#Q5). 
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1. A dimension on which the average respondent in an occupation scores higher than
another dimension can be regarded as more important (at a more sophisticated
level) to the occupation.
2. An occupation in which the average respondent scores a dimension higher than
the average respondent from another occupation can be regarded as more
important (higher level) to the occupation with the higher average score.
Together these features—along with a ranking of each occupation on each dimension—
make it possible to compare a pair of occupations according to their places in the 
distributions of the various O*Net dimensions.  Following this premise, we construct 
measures of the distance between each pair of occupations based rank, as well as the raw 
scores.  Though the results reported in the paper use the distances based on raw scores, 
the results are robust to using the rank-based distances as well. 
The second problem we confront is the existence of two scales per variable.  
There are two distinct, yet consequentially similar, options for treating them:  1) treat 
importance scores as separate dimensions or 2) treat them as weights.  The two (in the 
Euclidian sense) distance measures that result from these options are calculated as follow. 
(1) 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗 = � (𝐴𝑖𝑘 − 𝐴𝑗𝑘)2
𝑘∈𝐾
�
1
2 ;𝐾 includes all level and importance scores. 
(2) 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑗 = � 𝑊𝑖𝑘𝑊𝑗𝑘�𝐴𝑖𝑘 − 𝐴𝑗𝑘�2
𝑘∈𝐾
�
1
2
where,𝑊𝑖𝑘 = 𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑘
∑ 𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑘𝑘∈𝐾
;𝐾 includes only level scores. 
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We prefer the second formula—which uses the relative importance scores as weights—
because it distinguishes between level and importance.  Instead of counting all level and 
importance scores equally, the weighted version counts level scores that are important to 
both occupations heavily and those that are unimportant (to at least one) only slightly.  
Only if the two occupations differ on important characteristics will they be measured as 
“far away” by this measure—whereas unimportant differences could result in an 
overstatement of the distance as measured in number 1.  Consequently this paper employs 
the second (importance weights) calculation of distance between occupations.  Once 
again, however, we have estimated the divorce model using non-importance-weighted 
distances and the estimates are robust to this. 
There are four O*Net files utilized in this exercise:  abilities, activities, skills, and 
knowledge.  A distance measure can be calculated for each of the four, as well as an 
“overall” measure.  The usefulness of this measure inheres in evaluating the proximity of 
any pair of occupations’ skill, ability, knowledge, and activity sets.  We calculate them 
for every pair of occupations—as defined in the 2000 Census classification scheme.  
Then the measures can be matched to observed pairs of occupations (one per spouse) in 
any household-level micro data including spousal pairs. 
4. Data and Methods
A.  Data 
The household-level data in which we observe marriages dissolve or endure come 
from the 2003, 2005, and 2007 waves of the PSID (Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
public use dataset).  Consecutive observations of each household reveal married couples 
and their marital status 2 years later.  A binary (“remain married” equals 0) variable for 
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Table 8:  Summary statistics of key variables. 
Pooled One Earners Two Earners 
Variable Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Occupations Distance 'Abilities' - - - - 0.123 0.050 
Occupations Distance 'Activities' - - - - 0.196 0.071 
Occupations Distance 'Skills' - - - - 0.159 0.067 
Occupations Distance 
'Knowledge' - - - - 0.270 0.093 
|Age(Male)-Age(Female)| 3.488 3.541 3.648 3.781 3.447 3.477 
Years Married (Imputed) 15.111 12.019 20.116 14.576 13.840 10.922 
Age of Man When Married 29.270 8.917 29.153 10.006 29.300 8.621 
Age of Woman When Married 27.082 8.241 26.913 9.073 27.125 8.018 
Female is Older (=1) 0.202 0.401 0.215 0.411 0.199 0.399 
Spouses same religion (=1) 0.766 0.423 0.799 0.401 0.758 0.429 
Husband is white 0.715 0.451 0.725 0.447 0.713 0.453 
Husband is black 0.195 0.396 0.174 0.380 0.200 0.400 
Wife is white 0.726 0.446 0.733 0.443 0.724 0.447 
Wife is black 0.190 0.392 0.176 0.381 0.194 0.395 
Spouses are same race (=1) 0.940 0.238 0.950 0.219 0.937 0.243 
Head's Parents Intact (=1) 0.784 0.412 0.793 0.406 0.782 0.413 
Years Education Head 13.396 2.625 13.168 2.901 13.454 2.548 
Years Education Spouse 13.452 2.452 13.133 2.555 13.533 2.420 
|Education(Head)-
Education(Spouse)| 1.513 1.632 1.563 1.605 1.500 1.639 
Educ(HH) *Educ(Wife) 184.180 57.460 177.896 62.081 185.777 56.130 
Husband earnings in 1000s 50.261 102.447 54.941 169.437 49.072 76.637 
Wife earnings in 1000s 23.650 24.963 7.357 24.370 27.790 23.372 
Wife earns more (=1) 0.270 0.444 0.228 0.420 0.281 0.449 
City Pop. >=500k 0.140 0.347 0.132 0.338 0.142 0.349 
100k<City Pop.<500k 0.253 0.435 0.236 0.425 0.257 0.437 
50k<City Pop.<100k 0.114 0.317 0.110 0.314 0.114 0.318 
25k<City Pop.<50k 0.130 0.337 0.130 0.336 0.131 0.337 
10k<City Pop.<25k 0.171 0.377 0.199 0.400 0.164 0.370 
1 Kid 0.219 0.414 0.166 0.373 0.233 0.423 
2 Kids 0.239 0.426 0.230 0.421 0.241 0.428 
3 Kids 0.082 0.274 0.077 0.267 0.083 0.276 
4 Kids 0.024 0.152 0.044 0.206 0.018 0.134 
5 or More Kids 0.007 0.086 0.012 0.107 0.006 0.080 
Owns Home 0.821 0.384 0.818 0.386 0.821 0.383 
Have Debt (=1) 0.572 0.495 0.470 0.500 0.598 0.491 
IRA or Pvt. Annuity (=1) 0.207 0.405 0.190 0.392 0.212 0.409 
Exactly 1 spouse smokes (=1) 0.182 0.386 0.195 0.397 0.179 0.383 
Moved last year (=1) 0.267 0.442 0.215 0.411 0.280 0.449 
Variance (Husband's Occ.) 
Earnings - - - - 0.749 2.240 
Variance (Wife's Occ.) Earnings - - - - 0.592 1.521 
Earnings Covariance (Pair) - - - - 0.054 0.777 
Head Married > Once (=1) 0.254 0.435 0.275 0.447 0.248 0.432 
Same Industry (=1) - - - - 0.114 0.317 
Sample Size 2549 517 2032 
The sample summarized in this table is the 2003 cross-section of the PSID. 
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marital status in the future period is the dependent variable.3  Our sample consists of 
couples that are married in the current period and in which at least one reports an 
occupation. 
The PSID contains a wealth of control variables as well; nearly all of the 
correlates of divorce found in earlier literature are available (or can be imputed).  There 
are 4141 observations of married dual-earning couples in the pooled sample (those 
married in 2003, 2005 or both) and 1427 married households in which just one spouse 
works.  Table 8 reports summary statistics for relevant variables from the 2003 wave. 
There are a few limitations that we face when constructing control variables that 
are noteworthy in comparison with the rest of the literature.  We do not explicitly observe 
pre-marital cohabitation in the sample.  Also the survey only asks about marital status of 
the parents of the head of the household—not the spouse.  So we only observe whether 
one of the spouses has parents that remained married during childhood.  Variables 
indicating the receipt of Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), and “other 
welfare” exist in the PSID, but a very small number of respondents (18) report receiving 
any welfare.  We have not included these variables because of the trivial extent to which 
they vary. 
B.  Methods 
The empirical methods and notation follow Charles and Stephens (2004, 496-97) 
and Weiss and Willis (1997) closely.  A couple’s separation hazard at a given time, 
3 Though not reported in the paper, the results are also robust to an ordered divorce variable in which 
couples that separate are coded as “1”, those that divorce are coded as “2” and those that remain married 
are coded as “0”. 
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conditional on having remained married as long as they have, depends on the gain in 
utility they get when married compared to dissolution (net of costs):  𝑉𝑡 ≡ gain, year 𝑡. (3) 𝑉𝑡 = 𝐺�𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑠′𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠(𝑡)� + 𝛽𝐸𝑡{𝑚𝑎𝑥[𝑉𝑡+1,𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑡 + 1)| 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑠]}+ (𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡) − 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑡)|𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑠. 
The gain consists of the value of marriage, in three parts:  present household utility (𝐺), 
an expectation of future utility, a stochastic part, expressed net of the opportunity cost of 
marriage.  Spouses remain married when the gain is positive and dissolve the marriage 
otherwise.  In our paper, the objects of interest are variables in the match-fixed 
(“quality”) effect, 𝜇𝑖, which makes the gains larger and the match less likely to dissolve.  
Under Charles’s and Stephens’s assumptions, the separation hazard (S) is a linear 
function (g) of the duration of the marriage, the characteristics of the spouses, and the 
match-fixed effects: (4) 𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝑔[𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 , 𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡, 𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡,𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖], 
where (𝜕𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝜕𝜇𝑖
< 0), and the effects can be estimated using a probit model: 
(5) 𝑃𝑟�𝑦 = 𝑦𝑗�𝑋� = 𝑓[Φ(𝑋𝛽)]. 
In equation (5), f is the probit function and 𝑦𝑗 ∈ {0,1}.  The outcome variable, y, equals 1 
if the couple is separated or divorced; it equals 0 if they remain married.  X is the vector 
of explanatory variables listed in Table 8.  Charles and Stephens and Weiss and Willis 
attempted to control for the match-fixed effects, but their main focus was on earnings 
shocks.  We are directly interested in measures of match-specific quality in this paper, 
however.  Those previous authors used variables such as demographic and educational 
homogamy to capture match-fixed effects.  The present paper can be viewed as moving 
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this literature a step forward by incorporating additional match-quality measures based on 
heterogamy in X, specifically the spouses’ occupations. 
The danger in relying on dissimilarity measures based on the spouses’ 
occupations is that features of the occupations, themselves, factor into the marital value 
function:  occupational characteristics may contribute directly to household utility (1st 
term in (3)), and they may also reveal the value of a spouse’s outside options (last term in 
(3)).  For this reason two sets (husband and wife) of indicators for the spouses’ 
occupations are included in the models we estimate.  Additionally the information 
embodied in our distance measures could be related to the variability and co-variability of 
occupational earnings.  These should not be confused with measurements of match 
quality, which is how we would like to interpret the effects of the distance measures.  
Consequently measures of each spouse’s occupation’s (intertemporal real) earnings 
variance and the pairwise covariance are included in the model to control for any link 
between the O*Net distances and correlated earnings.  The March CPS (1971-2012) is 
used to calculate the variances and covariance statistics (King, et al. 2012).4   
We estimate 𝛽 in the probit equation (5), calculate marginal effects for the 
distance measures from the estimates, and the estimated marginal effects show whether 
having dissimilar occupations is bad for marital stability.  Since the data include multiple 
(2003 and 2005) observations of the same households, all standard errors reported are 
calculated based on clusters for each household.  All marginal effects reported are with 
respect to the probability of dissolution, i.e., positive effects are destabilizing. 
4 The annual average real earnings are calculated for each occupation-year.  They are expressed as natural 
logs, de-meaned (cross-sectionally), and then used to calculate variance (per occupation’s time series) and 
covariance (per pair of occupations):  𝑠2(𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖) = (𝑇 − 1)−1 ∑ (𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑦�𝑖)2𝑡  and 𝑠𝑖𝑗 =(𝑇 − 1)−1 ∑ (𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑦�𝑖)(𝑦𝑗𝑡 − 𝑦�𝑗)𝑡 . 
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One of the primary challenges presented by household data is that some 
households have only one employed spouse.  Consequently the distance between the 
spouses’ occupations is not observed.  It prompts the question:  “how far away from the 
employed spouse’s occupation would the non-employed spouse’s occupation be if they 
were to work?”  To address this problem, we attempt two separate fixes:   
1. use the non-working spouse’s first full time (adult) occupation in place of the
current occupation when calculating distances, and
2. use the non-working spouse’s first occupation to identify a probabilistic current
occupation and measure distance based on the expected occupation.
Resolving the issue of single earner households is crucial because there is reason to 
believe that single earner households would match differently.  The single earners are 
demonstrably specializing in labor market and home production, whereas the dual earners 
demonstrate shared consumption or productivity, as advanced by Clark & Kanbur or 
Benham.  It is conceivable that the former group sorts negatively (e.g., on wages) and the 
latter group sorts positively. 
Of the 1427 single earner observations in the sample, we can estimate 1068 of 
their distance measures using the first full-time occupation for the non-working spouse, 
and we can estimate 1070 of them using the probabilistic approach (occupation with 
highest probability conditional on first full-time occupation).  Though both methods yield 
similar probit results, the second is particularly attractive since it relies on revelations of 
the occupations that working spouses have joined and presumably non-working spouses 
would join.  Number two is less direct in this regard, but it allows for the possibility of 
career progression in the interim between the first job and the present.  The probabilistic 
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occupation is the present occupation with the highest probability of selection, conditional 
on the individual’s first full-time occupation. 
Table 9:  Summary statistics for and correlation measures among distance measures. 
Summary Statistics 
Distance 
Measure 
Number 
Combinations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Abilities 126,253 0.142 0.053 0 0.417 
Activities 126,253 0.222 0.071 0 0.568 
Knowledge 126,253 0.180 0.069 0 0.577 
Skills 126,253 0.301 0.083 0 0.663 
Overall 126,253 0.444 0.122 0 1.007 
Correlation Structure 
Distance 
Measure Abilities Activities Knowledge Skill Overall 
Abilities 1.000 
Activities 0.701 1.000 
Skill 0.803 0.761 1.000 
Knowledge 0.590 0.647 0.656 1.000 
Overall 0.812 0.877 0.880 0.895 1.000 
These statistics are calculated prior to matching the distance measures to the PSID data.  Hence they are 
not weighted to account for the prevalence of spousal pairings in occupation, i.e., the statistics treat all 
pairs as equally probable and attach equal weight.  Our intention when reporting the measures of 
association is to show that each pair of measures is positively correlated and measures dissimilarity, but 
several pairs, such as Activities and Knowledge are far from perfectly correlated.  Those two measures 
are capturing different dimensions of dissimilarity. 
5. Results
A.  Dual Earner Households 
As a convenient point of departure, we present the results of the probit divorce 
model using the sample of married households for which we observe distance.  The 
coefficient on “overall distance” between spouses’ occupations is not significant in this 
model.  However if the 4 constituent distance measures are included individually, two of 
them (activities and knowledge) have significant coefficients.  We report these results on 
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Table 10 in columns 1 and 2.  This result is comparable if the model is specified as an 
ordered probit (not reported). 
Table 10:  Divorce model:  dual earner households, marginal effects of distance measures. 
Probit 
Dependent Variable:  Divorce (=1) 1 2 
Overall Distance 0.0328 - 
(0.0266) - 
Ability Distance - 0.1244 
- (0.1040) 
Activities Distance - 0.1623** 
- (0.0749) 
Skills Distance - 0.0755 
- (0.0895) 
Knowledge Distance - -0.1972*** 
- (0.0617) 
Household-Year Pairs 4141 4141 
Includes Controls Yes Yes 
Includes Occupation Indicators (Both Spouses) Yes Yes 
Log Likelihood -629.43 -622.38 
Pseudo R Squared 0.1046 0.1146 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.  All standard errors are cluster robust.  Marginal effects refer to the
effect on the probability of dissolution (y=1).  In the interest of brevity, the coefficient estimates on other 
covariates are relegated to a table in the appendix. 
We report the marginal effects of the distance measures on Table 10.  They are 
calculated as the effect on the probability of dissolution (separation or divorce).  These 
show that distance between activities of the spouses’ jobs is bad for the match in terms of 
divorce.  Distance between the required knowledge is good for the match in terms of 
fewer divorces.   In the interest of brevity, the tables only contain the binary probit 
results, but we have also estimated them as ordered probits, binary logits and ordered 
logits, and the estimates are materially the same.  The next set of estimates uses the same 
set of X variables, with the exceptions of the “same industry” indicator and that they use 
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the estimated occupations of non-employed spouses to measure distance for single-earner 
households in the sample. 
B.  Single Earner Households 
We next proceed to analyzing the results for single-earner households.  Again, the 
idea in looking at households where only one person works is to provide a cleaner test of 
the marital theories.  Households have already revealed a preference for specializing in 
home and market work if only one works.  Thus, any remaining influence of the 
occupational distance measures for these households suggests inherent differences among 
spouses that might explain the strength of marriages.   
The lack of current occupational information for one spouse, however, requires us 
to construct the distance measures from partial information.  One strategy to deal with 
single earner households is to predict how far away from one another their occupations 
would be, conditional on their other characteristics.  This would amount to an out-of-
sample prediction of the distances (“distance hats”) using information from the 2 earner 
sub-sample.  Among the significant questions about the validity of such a procedure, it 
ignores any information contained in the working spouse’s occupation.  We observe the 
location of that spouse’s occupation within the space—which should reveal something 
about the location of the other spouse’s occupation.  Some occupations are in densely 
populated parts of the space and are close to many other occupations, whereas others are 
remotely located within the space. 
Our preferred strategy for treating single earner households estimates the 
occupation instead of the distance; then the distance is measured from the observed 
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occupation to the synthetic one.  The PSID contains the first full-time occupation of the 
respondents, and one could simply use that occupation in place of the unobserved current 
occupation.  Estimates of the divorce model using this method are in Table 11.  This 
result is consistent with the two earner sample in terms of the signs on the marginal 
effects, but the estimates are less precise.  The single earner sample’s estimates find a 
stronger destabilizing effect for activities distance, and it does not find the dual earner 
sample’s stabilizing effect of knowledge distance. 
Table 11:  Divorce model using first full-time occupation and probabilistic occupation for one earner 
households. 
Dependent Variable:  Divorce (=1) 1 2 3 
Ability Distance Marginal Effect -0.3410 -0.1388 -0.0732 
(0.2112) (0.1818) (0.1710) 
Activities Distance Marginal Effect 0.2332 0.1721 0.2115 
(0.1052)** (0.1101) (0.1106)* 
Skills Distance Marginal Effect 0.3506 0.0199 -0.0533 
(0.1233)*** (0.1268) (0.1309) 
Knowledge Distance Marginal Effect -0.0041 -0.0866 -0.1659 
(0.0982) (0.0898) (0.0861)* 
Sample 
1 Earner 
Married 
1 Earner 
Married 
1 Earner 
Married 
Missing Occupation 
First Full 
Time Probabilistic Probabilistic 
Household-Year Pairs 1068 1070 1070 
Includes Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Includes Occupation Indicators (Both 
Spouses) Yes Yes 
Yes; Interact 
with 
Indicator for 
Employed 
(=1) 
Log Likelihood -113.76 -120.68 -117.97 
Pseudo R Squared 0.3457 0.2930 0.3089 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.  Cluster (household) robust standard errors for the marginal effects in
parentheses.  A positive marginal effect signifies an increased probability of dissolution. 
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The second and third columns on Table 11 allows for the likelihood that 
individuals travel along paths of occupations that are predictable based on their first full-
time occupations.  Identifying the occupation with the highest probability conditional on 
the first occupation lets us assign a distance measure that more closely resembles two 
spouses employed in the present period.  Using the probabilistic occupation yields 
comparable estimates to the first full-time occupation; the marginal effects are similar 
except for the disappearance of the destabilizing effect of skills distance.  Additionally 
the signs on the activities and knowledge effects match the signs from the two earner 
sample.  But their precision is sensitive to whether or not the occupation indicators switch 
on for spouses that probabilistically (not actually) work in the occupation (column 3). 
Table 12:  Divorce model using pooled sample. 
Dependent Variable:  Divorce (=1) 1 2 
Ability Distance Marginal Effect 0.0469 0.0783 
(0.0958) (0.0933) 
Activities Distance Marginal Effect 0.1606 0.1821 
(0.0649)** (0.0655)*** 
Skills Distance Marginal Effect 0.1111 0.0536 
(0.0770) (0.0793) 
Knowledge Distance Marginal Effect -0.1714 -0.1925 
(0.0526)*** (0.0530)*** 
Sample 
1 and 2 Earners 
Pooled 
1 and 2 Earners 
Pooled 
Missing Occupation First Full Time Probabilistic 
Household-Year Pairs 5211 5213 
Includes Controls Yes Yes 
Includes Occupation Indicators (Both 
Spouses) Yes Yes 
Log Likelihood -771.48 -772.60 
Pseudo R Squared 0.1203 0.1159 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.  Cluster (household) robust standard errors for the marginal effects in
parentheses.  A positive marginal effect signifies an increased probability of dissolution.  The marginal 
effects are "grand margins".  The group marginal effects are shown and tested for equality on the next 
table. 
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Table 13:  Wald tests of differences by household type. 
Divorce Model Interaction Terms 1 2 
Activities Distance 
2 Earner 0.1666 0.1774 
(0.0754)** (0.0752)** 
1 Earner 0.1376 0.2003 
(0.1092) (0.1149)* 
Chi Squared 0.05 0.03 
Knowledge Distance 
2 Earner -0.1842 -0.2043 
(0.0595)*** (0.0598)*** 
1 Earner -0.1217 -0.1470 
(0.0925) (0.0901) 
Chi Squared 0.35 0.31 
Sample 
1 and 2 Earners 
Pooled 
1 and 2 Earners 
Pooled 
Missing Occupation First Full Time Probabilistic 
Household-Year Pairs 5211 5213 
Includes Controls Yes Yes 
Includes Occupation Indicators (Both 
Spouses) Yes Yes 
Log Likelihood -771.48 -772.60 
Pseudo R Squared 0.1203 0.1159 
This table shows the marginal effects of the two significant distance measures by household type (single 
and dual earners).  A positive marginal effect signifies an increased probability of dissolution.  Both 
columns are derived from the estimates on Table 12, estimating marginal effects for the two groups 
using group-specific covariate means.  The Chi Squared statistic tests the null hypothesis that both 
groups’ marginal effects are equal.  Cluster (household) robust standard errors for the marginal effects in 
parentheses.  The emphasis is on the non-significance of the Chi Squared statistics, which leads us to not 
reject the null hypothesis that distance has a common effect on marital stability for both types of 
households. 
Lastly we present the estimates on the pooled sample using these methods to 
address missing distances.  Since this includes both types of households, we include an 
indicator for the single earner sub-sample.  We also interact that indicator with the four 
distance measures and test whether the effect of distance on marital stability differs for 
the two groups.  This test summarizes the primary conclusion as well:  regardless of 
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whether both spouses work, similarities between their vocational activities stabilize the 
marriage, and similarities between their vocational knowledge destabilize the marriage.  
We do not reject the null hypothesis that the effect is equal for both groups in the sample 
(Table 13).  The full set of estimates is contained on a very large table in the appendix; it 
includes all of the explanatory variables from the models on Table 9 and Table 12 except 
for occupation indicators (because of their large number). 
C.  Discussion 
The empirical results suggest that the combination of two spouses’ chosen 
occupations—even if one of them is essentially a counterfactual—predicts whether the 
marriage will dissolve.  Specifically more distant occupations in terms of activities 
destabilize a marriage, and more distant occupations in terms of knowledge stabilize a 
marriage.  This finding is apparent among households with either one spouse or two 
spouses employed as well as both groups pooled together.  It is consistent across methods 
for treating single earner households. 
What do these dissimilarity measures mean for the several theories of marriage?  
An inference may be made by examining the descriptions of the O*Net variables in the 
appendix.  As the broad categories suggest, activities consist of actions workers perform 
on their jobs, and knowledge consists of the content information needed to perform each 
job successfully.  Occupation choices based on items on the activities list are more 
reflective of preferences, whereas choices based on the knowledge reflect comparative 
advantage.  A worker with a given set of knowledge can be expected to gravitate toward 
an occupation that entails performing relatively pleasurable activities.  Similarly a worker 
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with a given set of preferences over activities can be expected to choose an occupation at 
which he possesses masterful knowledge.  Applying this interpretation to spouses’ 
occupational distance measures, spouses who perform similar activities at work are 
treated as having similar preferences and spouses whose jobs require similar knowledge 
are treated as having similar comparative advantages. 
These interpretations therefore allow a way of testing the theories of marriage.  
The effect of increased occupational distance on the probability of marital dissolution 
could have several explanations.  First they could reveal something about the earnings of 
the occupations that transcends the individuals’ observed earnings, i.e., volatility, 
expectations, or correlation.  Characteristics of one’s occupational earnings profile enter 
the marital gains function separately from the effect of match quality.  Second 
occupations could reveal the values of spouses’ options outside of marriage.  Third they 
could reveal match quality directly by capturing non-redundant household capital and 
overlapping preferences for household goods, as described in the preceding paragraph.  
This is the interpretation we endorse, considering that the estimates condition on the 
chosen occupations themselves, using indicator variables, and their earnings variance and 
covariance.  Consequently the risk of confusing the effects of the distances with 
occupational earnings effects and marital opportunity costs is minimal. 
The stabilizing effect of similar activities supports theories of marriage predicated 
upon preferences for household (especially non-rival) goods.  The results suggest that 
spouses are better matched when their preferences for activities overlap.  We caution that 
preferences for work activities must be representative of preferences for goods to make 
this conclusion truly sound.  Models of marriage based on non-rival household goods fit 
60
nicely with this result since they are particularly likely to be experiential in nature, e.g., 
leisure activities and spending time with children.  Preferences for these non-rival 
household activities therefore would reasonably be assumed to be related to preferences 
for work activities. 
Models of marriage based on specialization gain support from our findings as 
well.  Spouses with relatively distant (non-redundant) knowledge are less likely to 
divorce, even if both of them work instead of fully availing themselves of specialization.  
If anything knowledge distance is even more important to households in which both 
spouses work.  The finding that non-redundant knowledge benefits dual earning couples, 
however, suggests that there is some household production that involves both spouses 
and increases with the diversity of the spouses’ knowledge.  A more subtle question 
(suggested by Lam) that is not answered is whether the stabilizing effect for single 
earners originates from home production of a non-rival household good or whether those 
goods are purchased a la Lam’s preliminary (471-72) model.  There is no clear support 
for a productivity-enhancing effect of spousal knowledge—at least not directly on 
divorce probability.  If one spouse is benefiting from the knowledge of the other, the 
effect on marital stability must be operating indirectly through earnings—since similar 
knowledge means less stability in our model. 
It is also interesting to note that occupational earnings covariance stabilizes a 
marriage.  Its effect is same-signed and statistically significant in the two earner sample 
and the pooled sample.  This could be because both occupations are trending upward 
(part of the reason their earnings are correlated) and the expected earnings growth 
increases marital gains.  Other speculations are possible, as well, but at face value this 
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evidence downplays occupational diversification as a method for combating earnings risk 
in a marriage. 
Finally the results of this paper speak to some of the issues raised by Lich-Tyler 
(2003) and Clark and Kanbur (2004), respectively:  the increasing importance of 
preference-based matching when incomes are higher and the increasing possibility of 
mismatch when household public goods are relatively more important.  The first follows 
from a de-emphasis on home production in favor of purchasing household goods as 
incomes rise.  Since the specialization motive for matching to a spouse becomes less 
pronounced, it becomes increasingly important to agree with one’s spouse in terms of 
shared consumption preferences.  The second comes from spousal sorting that 
emphasizes the distributions of tastes among the two sexes.  If the distributions do not 
overlap sufficiently, the outer tails of the two groups get matched together in Clark and 
Kanbur’s model, i.e., couples with opposing preferences.  These heterogeneous couples 
are marginally matched and vulnerable to separation.  A specification including an 
interaction between the distance measures and household income may illuminate the first 
question, and a version including measures of how idiosyncratic each spouse’s job is may 
reveal the degree of “preference mismatch”. 
6. Conclusions
When pop singer Paula Abdul and a cartoon cat depicting the male lead 
performed the song, “Opposites Attract” (1990), they were right and wrong about 
marriage.  An idea as old as comparative advantage dictates that opposites attract in order 
to reap the greatest gains from specialization.  Our findings confirm that spouses with 
dissimilar knowledge are better matched, other things equal.  However, more usually the 
62
phrase refers to opposites on more personal dimensions.  In this paper those interpersonal 
sources of attraction are measured as dissimilarity of activities revealed through choice of 
occupation.  In this context, opposite preferences for activities repel, other things equal. 
Previous theoretical work by economists has predicted the findings in this 
paper—that similar preferences likely generate substantial marital gains, but 
specialization in disparate tasks generates marital gains as well.  Taken as a whole, the 
results of this study empirically support each hypothesis.  The reader should be cautioned 
that the credible interpretations of the two significant distance measures we advance are 
predicated on assumptions that knowledge and preferences over activities are revealed 
through occupation choice and that they translate into preferences and productive inputs 
for household goods. 
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Occupational Distance and Pairwise Earnings 
Correlation 
66
1. Introduction
Evidence that the specificity of human capital follows occupational lines has been 
accumulating in the forms of returns to occupational tenure (Kambourov and Manovskii, 
Occupational Specificity of Human Capital 2009), earnings penalties associated with 
“skill switching” by displaced workers (Poletaev and Robinson 2008), and the pattern of 
occupational mobility (Gathmann and Schӧnberg 2010).  This confirms what is widely 
assumed: that occupations are a basis for differentiation among labor market, with 
boundaries drawn either by an official taxonomy or according to requisite human capital 
common to multiple occupations.  Even if each occupation requires a unique set of 
human capital, some pairs’ (of occupations) requirements overlap more than other pairs.  
This prompts the question of how the wages in each occupation relate to each other.  
Specifically, do occupations with more similar human capital requirements have earnings 
that more consistently move together?  This paper identifies which occupations’ earnings 
move together over time and to what degree co-movement can be explained by measures 
of occupational dissimilarity (distance). 
There are several reasons one would wish to know about the co-movement of 
wages across occupations.  In addition to the value of that knowledge for studies of 
business cycles, it would also help workers assemble a portfolio of human capital that 
would help them smooth economic shocks (e.g., by maintaining skills useful in 
occupations that covary negatively with one another), or individuals to find a spouse 
equipped to reduce fluctuations in household income.  However surprisingly little 
analysis has been performed to uncover determinants of intertemporal earnings 
correlation across occupations.  This paper fills that void by combining two sets of 
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statistics that are both interesting in their own right:  a catalog of the correlations between 
occupations’ (log of average annual) earnings using data from the last several decades in 
the U.S. and the corresponding distance measures based on occupational attributes. 
In the tradition of the aforementioned authors, I use measures of dissimilarity 
between pairs of occupations to expose predictors of occupational earnings correlation.  
Specifically the measures I employ are distances between each pair of occupations’ 
O*Net (2011) measures.  These measures capture how different the requisite human 
capital and tasks performed are between two occupations.  The hypothesis is that pairs of 
occupations that are different, in terms of distance measures constructed from the O*Net, 
have less correlated earnings because they have fewer skills in common and, hence, 
weaker dependence between their demand shifts.  I find modest support for this 
hypothesis.  Several distance measures reveal a statistically significant relationship with 
the earnings correlation measures, however their overall explanatory power is weak. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides an 
overview of the theoretical bases for occupational earnings correlation and the current 
state of this analysis heretofore.  Section 3 summarizes the data and methods used in the 
present analysis.  Section 4 summarizes the results, and Section 5 discusses their 
interpretation and concludes. 
2. Background and Literature Review
The closest antecedent to this paper is Conley and Dupor’s (2003) analysis of 
industry-specific productivity growth.  Their research is a natural point of departure for 
two reasons.  First it contains a simple framework for modeling how sectors’ productivity 
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growth rates co-move.  Second Conley and Dupor (C&D) utilize distance measures based 
on each pair of industries’ input vectors, i.e., the shares of input costs paid to the other 
sectors.  Methods used in this paper are similar to those in C&D section 4.1, in which the 
covariance between sectoral productivity shocks is a function of the distance measures 
between sectors (340-42).  A salient difference between this paper and theirs is the use of 
occupations as the unit of analysis instead of industries. 
C&D examine the consequences of stochastic technological progress in multiple 
sectors that grow at different rates, which dates back to Lucas and Prescott (1974), was 
elaborated upon by Lilien (1982), and creates “sectoral shifts” in labor markets.  The 
shocks originate either in output demand and affect derived labor demand or in the 
sector’s production technology directly.  In either case, the consequence is sector-specific 
demand fluctuations and wage differentials.  In a frictionless labor market, reallocation 
by workers would then compete away the differentials, resulting in two wage 
movements:  up with sectoral shocks and down with entry.  Sectors with co-varying 
wages, then, would be the consequence of contemporaneous shocks and responses.  In 
this paper I address both main sources of contemporaneous shocks to occupations’ 
wages.  I measure how different each pair of occupations’ industry allocations are; this 
measures the degree to which they receive common derived demand shocks.  And I 
measure how different their human capital requirements are.  This measures the extent to 
which they have common underlying skill content—the productive inputs that their firms 
employ. 
The values of underlying skills, then, ultimately determine wages, e.g., the 
popular idea (explained eloquently by Welch (1969)) that earnings are a sum of the 
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products of the worker’s skill endowments and the prices of the skills.  When technology 
changes such that demand for a skill increases, its price changes along with the earnings 
of all occupations that require the skill.  Thus correlation among several occupations’ 
demand shocks, à la C&D (328-29), reflects the degree to which their skill contents 
overlap.  Several complications ought to be pointed out, though. 
The responses to sectoral wage differentials need not be a textbook supply shift.  
Reder (1955) identified two channels through which sectoral shifts occur:  bidding up 
wages to attract employees and relaxation of hiring standards.  Both accomplish the shift, 
but they have opposing implications for wages, with the latter downgrading the 
composition of the occupation as an alternative to raising its wages.  Which channel 
predominates depends on the extent to which workers of different skill levels are 
substitutable (more substitutable implying more down-grading).  This spawned a 
significant literature on cyclical upgrading, of which McLaughlin and Bils (2001) provide 
a modern example. 
Helwege (1992) explores the source of friction in responses to demand shifts, 
attempting to explain the durability of industry wage differentials.  She finds evidence 
that wage differentials persist because of persistent variation in human capital across 
industries.  The alternative theory, for which she finds no evidence, is that inter-industry 
differentials are only eroded by young workers entering high-paying industries and 
accumulating the necessary training, i.e., hiring standards are relaxed in response to the 
shift, and wages increase after a (training) lag.  This could obscure correlation in earnings 
as a measure of sectoral shocks if training takes longer in different sectors.  On the 
subject of occupational choice, though, Boskin (1974) found evidence that workers do 
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pick occupations in this fashion, i.e., in pursuit of the highest present discounted value of 
expected net earnings.  Moreover occupational mobility work by Kambourov and 
Manovskii (2009, a) finds that occupation-specific human capital is a significant source 
of both internal wage dispersion and trans-occupational friction. 
Finally sectors need not price skills uniformly.  This is a consequence of the 
impossibility of un-bundling a worker’s skills and selling them separately to the highest 
bidders, demonstrated by Heckman and Scheinkman (1987).  Accordingly a technology 
shock for a particular skill could induce a demand shift within some, but not all, of the 
occupations that require the skill. 
Given a measure of dissimilarity for the human capital of two occupations, it is 
still reasonable that the demand shifts for the occupations should be related to how 
distinct their requisites of human capital are.  This recommends applying C&D type 
analysis to occupational earnings correlation.  For reasons outlined above, however, 
distance need not predict less correlation in earnings universally.  Indeed some of the 
findings show greater distance predicting more correlated earnings, as well as several U-
shaped relationships between distance and earnings correlation. 
3. Data and Methods
A.  Data 
Most of the data come from two sources:  the O*Net content model and the 
March Current Population Survey (CPS).  The calculated correlation coefficients are 
based on yearly observations of the average real earnings in each occupation, classified 
by the 1990 Census taxonomy (used to compare occupations over many years in the 
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CPS).  The sample used is 1971 to 2012 inclusive, i.e., it extends back to when the 1970 
Census taxonomy for occupations was first used.  Earlier classifications do not translate 
sufficiently well into the uniform classification scheme used by the IPUMS CPS (King, et 
al. 2012) database, and inclusion of earlier years results in significant swaths of missing 
observations.  The Integrated Public use Microdata Series (IPUMS) uses a taxonomy for 
occupations called “OCC1990”—which is a minor revision of the 1990 Census 
taxonomy—and this makes occupations observed between 1971 and 2012 uniformly 
classifiable.  There are 386 occupations with time series observations spanning these 
years.  Thus there are 74,691 unique correlations possible:  386 “own” correlations and 
74,305 “cross” correlations.   
Distances in terms of occupational attributes are the hypothesized regressors that 
explain earnings correlation.  The regressors measure dissimilarity between two 
occupations in terms of the level at which workers must exhibit a given skill or perform 
an activity.  The data on occupational distance comes from the O*Net Content Model:  
“The O*NET database contains several hundred variables that represent descriptors of 
work and worker characteristics, including skill requirements”  (O*Net, O*Net 
Database).   The activities, abilities, knowledge and skills files contain the variables to 
measure distance between occupations, and a summary of these is available on the web 
site.1  The version 16.0 database from O*Net consists of scores, from worker and 
1 http://www.onetcenter.org/dl_files/ContentModel_Detailed.pdf. 
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occupational experts questionnaires, assessing the relevance of the various activities, 
abilities, knowledge, and skills to each occupation.2 
Relevance is measured on two (ordinal) scales for each occupational dimension:  
importance (1 to 5) and level (0 to 7).  The importance scale is accompanied by language 
such as “not important and “extremely important”.  The level scale is accompanied by 
“anchors” that communicate what constitutes a minimal level of performance and what 
constitutes a sophisticated level.  For example, the anchors for ability code, “1.A.2.b.2:  
Multi-limb Coordination” are shown below. 
Level 2:  “Row a boat” 
Level 4:  “Operate a forklift truck in a warehouse” 
Level 6:  “Play the drum set in a jazz band” 
The ordinal and subjective nature of the data poses an empirical problem:  an 
average of the scores among respondents from an occupation is meaningless except in 
comparison to averages among that occupation on other dimensions—or to other 
occupations’ averages on the same dimension.  A couple features of the scores ameliorate 
this problem, however. 
1. A dimension that the average respondent in an occupation scores higher than
another dimension can be regarded as more important (at a more sophisticated
level) to the occupation.
2 “An occupation expert is a person who has several years of experience and training in an occupation. He 
or she has the expert knowledge required to respond to questions about the skills, knowledge and activities 
required for work in the occupation” (https://onet.rti.org/faq_oe.cfm#Q5). 
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2. An occupation in which the average respondent scores a dimension higher
than the average respondent from another occupation can be regarded as more
important to the occupation with the higher average score.
Together these features, along with a ranking of each occupation on each dimension, 
make it possible to compare a pair of occupations according to their places in the 
distributions of the various O*Net dimensions.  When constructing multi-dimensional 
measures, the importance scales can also be used as weights to emphasize only 
dimensions that are important to both occupations. 
There are 377 occupation categories for which earnings and distances are both 
observed.  Therefore there are 9 occupations for which correlations are observed but not 
distances.  This is because occupational attributes for those occupations are not reported 
by the O*Net.3  Given the list of these occupations and their vague definitions, the 
occupational measures would be so imprecise that they would be quite uninformative.  
Excluding them from the analysis seems appropriate and does not harm sample size 
much:  reducing it to 70,876 (377*376) observations. 
There are two demand-side reasons for wages to move together:  synchronized 
productivity growth and synchronized output demand shocks.  The O*Net measures 
address the former but not the latter.  To overcome this, I measure how different each pair 
of occupations’ industry allocations are, using employer survey data available from the 
BLS (OES Occupational Data 2010).  If the shares of two occupations’ employment 
across industries is identical, e.g., 5% of each is in Construction, 10% of each is in 
3 The 9 occupations are:  “Legislators”, “Professionals not elsewhere classified”, “Office machine operators 
not elsewhere classified”, “Other telecom operators”, “Mechanics and repairers not elsewhere classified”, 
“Sheet metal duct installers”, “Machine operators not elsewhere classified”, “Military”, and “Unknown”. 
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Transportation, they are measured zero units away from one another.  Two such 
occupations would experience derived demand shocks, originating from output demand 
shocks, in tandem.  To distinguish this sort of distance from occupational content 
distance—which more likely reflects contrasting human capital—I employ two measures 
of industry employment distance.  One is based on the share of each industry’s 
employment, and the other is based on the share of the occupation’s employment.  Their 
calculation follows the Euclidean formula used to calculate occupational content 
distances. 
B.  Earnings Correlation Methods 
As the dependent variable, I use the correlation coefficient of the earnings for 
each pair of occupations, indexed by i and j.  These originate from longitudinal 
observations of the natural logarithm of average annual real earnings (by occupation).  
Each pair of occupations’ time series of earnings is used to calculate the correlation of 
their averages over time.  Additionally I perform a decomposition of the correlation that 
enables me to measure the portion that stems from similar time trends separately from the 
portion stemming from correlated residuals.   
The logs of average earnings are assumed to have components that are 
occupation-specific (𝛼𝑖), year-specific (𝛼𝑡), trend idiosyncratically over time, and have 
stochastic fluctuations around their trends (𝜀𝑖𝑡). (1) 𝑤𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, such that 𝜀𝑖𝑡~𝑁(0,𝜎𝜀2). 
75
An occupation’s time series sample mean and the cross-sectional sample mean, 
respectively, 𝑤�𝑖 and 𝑤�𝑡, estimate the expectations, 𝜇𝑖 ≡ 𝐸𝑡(𝑤𝑖𝑡), and 𝜇𝑡 ≡ 𝐸𝑖(𝑤𝑖𝑡), 
respectively.  Expressing earnings as the deviation from the cross-sectional mean 
(𝑤�𝑖𝑡 ≡ 𝑤𝑖𝑡 − 𝑤�𝑡) negates year-specific effects.  And expressing 𝑤�  as a deviation (“?̇?𝑖𝑡”) 
from its time series mean is the basis for the measured correlation (see appendix B). (2) 𝜎𝑖𝑗 ≡ 𝐸𝑡�?̇?𝑖𝑡?̇?𝑗𝑡� = ?̇?𝑖?̇?𝑗𝜎𝑡2 + 𝐶𝑜𝑣�𝜀𝑖𝑡, 𝜀𝑗𝑡� and, (3) 𝜌𝑖𝑗 ≡ 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟�?̇?𝑖𝑡, ?̇?𝑗𝑡� = 𝜎𝑖𝑗
�𝜎𝑖
2𝜎𝑗
2�
1
2
where,𝜎𝑖2 ≡ occupation i′s intertemporal variance = 𝐸𝑡(?̇?𝑖𝑡)2, and 
?̇?𝑖 ≡ 𝛽𝑖 − 𝐸
𝑖(𝛽𝑖). 
I calculate for each pair of occupations the sample estimate (𝑟𝑖𝑗) of 𝜌𝑖𝑗 and its 
components in (2), which enables me to estimate the determinants of each portion 
separately. 
There is a reason to interpret un-weighted results from this exercise with caution.  
The data themselves are sample means, i.e., they are calculated from CPS micro data.  
Consequently a pair of occupations with a large representation in the CPS and a precisely 
measured 𝑤𝑖𝑡 is weighted the same as a pair with a noisy measurement of 𝑤𝑖𝑡.  
Appropriate weighting of the observations in the earnings correlation model should 
improve the precision of its estimates.  So I calculate correlation coefficients in which the 
observations of average earnings are weighted by the inverse of their standard errors. 
Technically 𝑟 is a limited dependent variable because it takes values only on the 
interval [-1, 1].  Therefore it is questionable whether OLS is appropriate.  As a robustness 
check, I estimate a logistic-transformed version of equation 5 (below) but present OLS in 
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Table 14:  Correlation matrix of multidimensional distance measures and summary statistics. 
Correlation Matrix 
Multi-
Dimensional 
Distance 
Measure Abilities 
Act-
ivities Skills 
Know-
ledge 
Shares 
of 
Industry 
Shares of 
Occ. 
Abilities 1 
Activities 0.8094 1 
Skills 0.8992 0.8481 1 
Knowledge 0.7369 0.7571 0.7561 1 
Shares of 
Industry 
Employment 
(Across 
Industries) -0.0115 -0.0362 -0.0083 -0.0891 1 
Shares of 
Occupation 
Employment 
(Across 
Industries) 0.2624 0.2429 0.2229 0.3289 -0.0174 1 
Summary Statistics 
Variable n Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Min Max 
Abilities 70,876 0.0266 0.0096 0.2011 0 0.0569 
Activities 70,876 0.0291 0.0105 0.3801 0 0.0632 
Skills 70,876 0.0315 0.0136 0.4347 0 0.0768 
Knowledge 70,876 0.0351 0.0104 0.0881 0 0.0702 
Shares of 
Industry 
Employment 
(Across 
Industries) 70,876 0.1020 0.0962 1.7315 0 0.6539 
Shares of 
Occupation 
Employment 
(Across 
Industries) 70,876 0.7211 0.2838 0.0342 0 1.4093 
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this paper for transparency and ease of interpretation.4  The relationship between earnings 
correlation and occupational distance is not materially different, but the model fits better 
using the transformed LHS variable. 
C.  Explanatory Variables:  Distance Measures 
The question is which measures of distance predict correlation between two 
occupations’ earnings.  I answer this question by regressing the sample correlation 
coefficients (𝑟𝑖𝑗) on the distance measures using OLS. 
(5) 𝑟𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼 + � 𝛾𝑚𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑗161
𝑚=1
+ 𝜖𝑖𝑗, 
In (5) i and j are unique occupation pairs (𝑖 ≠ 𝑗), m indexes O*Net dimensions in the set 
of 161 distance measures.  I estimate the parameters (𝛾𝑚) in (5) with earnings correlation 
coefficient (or either of the components in (2)) as the dependent variable.  Together this 
set of three estimates reveals whether each occupational distance measure explains:  how 
strongly two occupations’ earnings trend together, how strongly their yearly earnings 
deviations from trend synch up, and how strongly earnings synch up, overall. 
The explanatory variables consist of distance measures, indicating how different 
each pair of occupations is in terms of the O*Net occupational attributes and in terms of 
their (employment) distributions across industries.  They are “distances” in the sense of 
measuring how far away from one another the occupations are in the rankings of all 
occupations.  Following this premise, I measure the distance between the content of each 
pair of occupations based on how many ranks away from one another they are on the 
4 The transformation is 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐�𝑟𝑖𝑗� = ln � �1+𝑟𝑖𝑗�(1−min {𝑟𝑖𝑗,   0.999})�. 
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O*Net scales.  For example, there are 41 activities dimensions (with an importance and a 
level scale for each).  In total 161 such measures are possible using the abilities, 
activities, knowledge, and skills files.  The (square of the) distance measure on dimension 
k for occupations i and j would be: (6)  𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑗 ≡ �𝐴𝑖𝑚 − 𝐴𝑗𝑚�2,where 𝐴𝑖𝑚 is the level score for occupation 𝑖 on dimension 𝑚. 
Since interpreting 161 coefficients individually is a challenge, I also calculate four multi-
dimensional distances based on each of four O*Net files:  abilities, activities, skills, 
knowledge.  For example, the distance between two occupations’ knowledge vectors 
would be, 
(7) 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒,𝑖𝑗 = �� 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑘 ∗ 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑗𝑘 ∗ 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑘𝑖𝑗33
𝑘=1
�
1
2. 
The multi-dimensional distance calculation sums over all the dimensions in one file and 
weights each dimension according to the relative importance in the two occupations. 
(8) 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑘 ≡ ��𝐵𝑖𝑘33
𝑘=1
�
−1
𝐵𝑖𝑘, 
where 𝐵𝑖𝑘is the importance score for occupation 𝑖 on dimension 𝑘. 
4. Results
A.  Earnings Correlation Estimates 
A histogram for the time series earnings correlations is shown in figure 3. 
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Figure 3:  Distribution of the correlation coefficients, pairs of occupations’ (logs of) average annual 
real earnings, histogram. 
Given the decomposition in equation (2), the explanatory factors for the 
(similarity in) time trends can be estimated separately from the explanatory factors for 
overall earnings correlation.  The distribution of the former is summarized in figure 4, 
and the distribution of the second component is shown in figure 5.  One fact worth noting 
is that where the correlation coefficients are bound by the interval [-1, 1], the two 
components are not.  Though some that fall outside the interval, such cases are rare. 
Since the number of unique correlations is large, the full set of estimates is hard to 
summarize concisely without narrowing the focus to a small number of occupations.  
Additionally the regression model in this paper is a novel attempt at making sense of this 
long list of correlation coefficients.  The pertinent question to be answered is, “what kind 
of occupation pairs have correlated wages?” 
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Figure 4:  Distribution of the time trends’ components of the correlation coefficients, pairs of 
occupations histogram. 
Note:  The range of this histogram extends beyond the interval [-1,1] because this is only one of the two 
components in the decomposed correlation coefficient.  This component, by itself, is not bound by the unit 
interval as long as the sum of this and the residuals component sums to [-1,1]. 
Figure 5:  Distribution of the residuals’ components of the correlation coefficients, pairs of 
occupations histogram. 
Note:  The range of this histogram extends beyond the interval [-1,1] because this is only one of the two 
components in the decomposed correlation coefficient.  This component, by itself, is not bound by the unit 
interval as long as the sum of this and the trends component sums to [-1,1]. 
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B.  Earnings Correlation Model 
After matching the earnings correlation coefficients for occupation pairs to the 
corresponding distance measures, I estimate the earnings correlation model (5).  The 
estimated coefficients and standard errors are presented on Table C1 in appendix C (first 
column uses the log of the transformed 𝑟𝑖𝑗) for the earnings correlation model.  Estimates 
are also presented in the third column for the distance measures’ effects on the time trend 
component of correlation.  And the fourth column shows the distance measures’ effects 
on the residuals’ component of correlation.  A lot of the distances have coefficients that 
are statistically significant; this is true of all three dependent variables.  For all three, the 
split between positive and negative is about equal.  Roughly one half of the distances 
have coefficients that are the same-sign for both components (columns 3 and 4); among 
these same-signed coefficients, the split is again roughly equal between positive and 
negative.  Despite numerous significant relationships between distance and measures of 
earnings correlation, the explanatory power of the model is weak, especially for the 
residuals component.  This is revealed by low 𝑅2 statistics in all four columns. 
To graphically summarize these results, I present a scatterplot of the coefficients 
from the “trends” regression against the coefficients from the “residuals” regression.  
This illustrates which dimensions of occupational distance contribute most to earnings 
correlation and through which part of the decomposition they do so.  The plots are 
divided into four groups, based on the O*Net file in which each is found.   Finally the 
plots are restricted to include only variables with at least one t statistic greater than 3 in 
absolute value.  This makes the graphs easier to read by excluding variables with 
imprecise coefficient estimates. 
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The multi-dimensional distance measures allow for an easier interpretation of how 
dissimilarity relates to earnings correlation.  They also reveal interesting non-monotonic 
relationships.  Table 16 presents the results of regressing earnings correlation on the four 
multi-dimensional distances and quadratics of those distances.  All four have statistically 
significantly non-monotonic relationships, with Abilities and Activities being the largest 
in magnitude.  Along with Knowledge, these three have U-shaped relationships with 
earnings correlation.  Distance between occupations initially means less correlation, but 
then a minimum is reached and far away occupations’ earnings become more correlated 
with distance.  Skills-related distance has the opposite shape (concave), reaching a 
maximum in the irrelevant (negative) range; therefore it is monotonically decreasing on 
the positive interval.  But it is the weakest predictor of the four.   
The industry distribution distance based on occupation employment shares 
exhibits a U-shaped relationship with earnings correlation, however, the minimum occurs 
in the negative range, so its earnings correlation is monotonically increasing in this 
distance (over the positive range).  The analogous measure based on the shares of 
industry employment exhibits an inverted U-shape, and is decreasing over the positive 
range.  This is the least surprising finding:  two sets of industry shares that are different 
from one another means the two occupations’ earnings are less correlated. 
5. Discussion and Conclusions
So far this research has been exploratory in nature.  I have not tested an explicit 
theoretical prediction of which distance measures should explain earnings correlation and 
why.  Generally my expectation is that dissimilarity makes two occupations’ earnings 
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Table 16:  Multi-dimensional distances’ relations to earnings correlation. 
Multi-Dimensional 
Distance Measure 1 2 3 4 
Abilities -1.7685 -4.5565 -3.9326 -9.7077 
(0.2504)*** (0.9288)*** (0.5645)*** (2.0942)*** 
Activities -0.4703 -3.9519 -0.9751 -8.6074 
(0.1949)** (0.7254)*** (0.4393)** (1.6355)*** 
Skills 0.4760 1.5237 1.0108 2.9788 
(0.1969)** (0.6396)** (0.4440)** (1.4421)** 
Knowledge -0.7425 -2.5981 -1.6381 -6.1058 
(0.1641)*** (0.6813)*** (0.3700)*** (1.5361)*** 
Shares of Industry 
Employment (Across 
Industries) -0.0366 0.0286 -0.0796 0.0692 
(0.0108)*** (0.0294) (0.0244)*** (0.0663) 
Shares of Occupation 
Employment (Across 
Industries) -0.0355 -0.1120 -0.0800 -0.2448 
(0.0038)*** (0.0175)*** (0.0086)*** (0.0395)*** 
Abilities Distance2 57.2940 119.9830 
(16.1768)*** (36.4733)*** 
Activities Distance2 55.6364 122.0760 
(10.9183)*** (24.6172)*** 
Skills Distance2 -21.0526 -41.7887 
(8.7824)** (19.8013)** 
Knowledge Distance2 30.0237 71.5185 
(8.9717)*** (20.2281)*** 
Industry Shares2 -0.1510 -0.3445 
(0.0734)** (0.1656)** 
Occupation Shares2 0.0547 0.1184 
(0.0116)*** (0.0262)*** 
Dependent Variable Earnings 
Correlation 
Earnings 
Correlation 
(Log of) 
Logit 
Transformed 
Correlation 
(Log of) 
Logit 
Transformed 
Correlation 
R Squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
n 70,876 70,876 70,876 70,876 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.  These are the estimates of the earnings correlation model using multi-
dimensional distances.  The emphasis in this table is on the shape of the relationships between distance 
and earnings correlation.  In each case there is significant non-monotonicity.  Abilities, Activities, and 
Knowledge each exhibit a U-shaped relationship with the earnings correlation, as do the industry 
allocation distances.  All the O*Net distances have been expressed as a fraction of 1000. 
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less positively correlated, but it seems unlikely to make them more negatively correlated.  
This suggests, though, that a non-monotonic relationship may exist, and indeed I find 
evidence of that using multi-dimensional distances.  Distances based on occupational 
abilities, activities, and knowledge exhibit a U-shaped relationship with earnings 
correlation.  This finding is novel compared to C&D’s finding of monotonicity among 
industries:  “. . . covariance patterns . . . appear dictated by [input-based] distances . . . 
covariance declines as [input-based] distances grow.” (Conley and Dupor 2003). 
If occupations’ labor markets mimicked C&D’s (2003) spatially correlated 
industries, pairs of occupations would experience common demand shifts owing to 
productivity changes that affect the human capital general to both occupations.  Then the 
more overlapping are their human capital requirements, the more correlation in demand 
shifts for the two occupations.  My finding of a U-shaped relationship between earnings 
correlation and distance suggests that overlapping human capital requirements is not the 
whole story.  It is tempting to conclude that the non-monotonicity reflects non-redundant 
and therefore complementary human capital embodied in far distant occupations.  
Accordingly a productivity increase for one would affect the demand for both 
occupations.  This conclusion, however, downplays the complexity of supply responses 
discussed in Section 2.  Especially since the explanatory power of the model is small, it is 
dubious that occupations experience frictionless spatially dependent sectoral shifts.  
Consequently I am reluctant to endorse the interpretation that the findings signal 
productive complementarity without qualification. 
There are other reasons to interpret these findings with care.  First there is 
employees’ expectations of the intertemporal earnings profile in each occupation, i.e., 
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climbing or declining.  This idea stems from Helwege’s (1992) paper, in which she 
reminds us that new entrants will require (pay) a premium to enter sectors with 
anticipated declining (climbing) future earnings.  That paper is about industries, but the 
reasoning applies to occupations:  more similarity between a pair of them suggests 
similar anticipated earnings streams.  It is clear neither how efficient employees’ 
expectations are nor to what extent they can act on predictable (a priori) earnings trends, 
but it’s just one more possible source of wage differentials to obscure the effects of 
sectoral shifts. 
With those caveats in mind, though, there are several useful lessons from the 
findings.  I have identified occupational attributes on which dissimilarity predicts less 
earnings correlation.  This is informative for employees who would like to diversify their 
human capital, e.g., if one’s present résumé demonstrates only a modest degree of “Social 
Perceptiveness,” he has an incentive to invest in this skill because occupations that 
require it tend to be “countercyclical” to those that do not (his present occupation).5 
Another significant application for these results is marital stability.  Risk-sharing 
theories of marriage (Weiss 1997) imply that household earnings risks can be reduced by 
diversifying, i.e., spouses choosing jobs with uncorrelated shocks.  Measuring correlation 
between the average incomes of two spouses’ occupations help identify the effect of 
having un-diversified earnings risks on the probability of marital dissolution. 
Simply measuring the pairwise correlation between occupations’ earnings is an 
exercise that bears fruit by itself, and several extensions are conceivable.  The present 
paper considers the entire period (1971-2012) to estimate earnings correlation.  But this 
5 Social Perceptiveness:  “Being aware of others’ reactions and understanding why they react as they do” 
(O*Net). 
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period could be analyzed in separate parts and used to observe changes in the degree of 
correlation in earnings.  Interesting questions about the effects of de-unionization, female 
labor force participation, and international trade liberalization could be answered by 
examining earnings correlations based on subsamples of the CPS, e.g., before and after 
enactment of NAFTA.
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Appendix A:  Divorce Model Full Set of Estimates 
Appendix Table A1:  Coefficient estimates on control variables. 
Probit Probit 
Dep. Variable:  Divorce (=1) 1 2 3 4 
Age Gap Absolute Value 0.0022 0.0023 0.0025 0.0027 
(0.0012)* (0.0012)** (0.0010)*** (0.0009)*** 
Years Married (Imputed) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0016) 
(0.0004)*** (0.0004)*** (0.0003)*** (0.0003)*** 
Age of Man When Married (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0015) (0.0015) 
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0009)* (0.0009)* 
Age of Woman When Married 0.0001 0.0001 0.0005 0.0005 
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0009) 
Female Older (0.0050) (0.0053) (0.0017) (0.0006) 
(0.0109) (0.0108) (0.0092) (0.0092) 
Spouses are same religion (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0040) (0.0041) 
(0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0060) (0.0059) 
Husband is white (0.0025) (0.0013) (0.0060) (0.0057) 
(0.0157) (0.0154) (0.0131) (0.0130) 
Husband is black 0.0039 0.0051 0.0033 0.0027 
(0.0207) (0.0204) (0.0190) (0.0191) 
Wife is white 0.0217 0.0220 0.0166 0.0169 
(0.0146) (0.0144) (0.0126) (0.0125) 
Wife is black 0.0258 0.0257 0.0249 0.0264 
(0.0239) (0.0237) (0.0208) (0.0208) 
Spouses are same race (0.0168) (0.0175) (0.0116) (0.0131) 
(0.0138) (0.0136) (0.0114) (0.0114) 
Head's Parents Intact (0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0125) (0.0126) 
(0.0064)** (0.0063)** (0.0057)** (0.0056)** 
Years Education Head 0.0071 0.0066 0.0059 0.0059 
(0.0054) (0.0053) (0.0042) (0.0041) 
Years Education Spouse 0.0091 0.0092 0.0079 0.0072 
(0.0056) (0.0055)* (0.0043)* (0.0042)* 
|Years Education Gap| (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0005) (0.0008) 
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0016) (0.0016) 
Educ.*Educ.(Spouse) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005) 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003)* (0.0003)* 
Male Spouse's earnings 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Female Spouse's earnings 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Female High Earner 0.0017 0.0018 0.0012 0.0010 
(0.0078) (0.0078) (0.0070) (0.0070) 
City Pop. >=500k (0.0052) (0.0056) (0.0013) (0.0011) 
(0.0105) (0.0104) (0.0091) (0.0091) 
100k<City Pop.<500k 0.0005 0.0000 (0.0010) (0.0020) 
(0.0086) (0.0085) (0.0076) (0.0077) 
50k<City Pop.<100k (0.0005) (0.0021) (0.0002) 0.0003 
(0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0100) (0.0099) 
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25k<City Pop.<50k (0.0141) (0.0155) (0.0147) (0.0146) 
(0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0099) (0.0099) 
10k<City Pop.<25k (0.0101) (0.0114) (0.0067) (0.0059) 
(0.0095) (0.0095) (0.0083) (0.0083) 
1 Kid 0.0147 0.0149 0.0096 0.0112 
(0.0077)* (0.0077)* (0.0071) (0.0071) 
2 Kids 0.0087 0.0081 0.0045 0.0064 
(0.0078) (0.0078) (0.0070) (0.0070) 
3 Kids 0.0096 0.0108 0.0085 0.0079 
(0.0111) (0.0108) (0.0097) (0.0097) 
4 Kids 0.0332 0.0319 0.0169 0.0169 
(0.0168)** (0.0168)* (0.0141) (0.0143) 
5 Kids or More 0.0334 0.0339 0.0196 0.0167 
(0.0331) (0.0318) (0.0241) (0.0244) 
Owns House (0.0096) (0.0102) (0.0150) (0.0143) 
(0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0067)** (0.0067)** 
Have Debt 0.0025 0.0029 0.0042 0.0046 
(0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0055) (0.0055) 
IRA or Annuity (0.0121) (0.0127) (0.0100) (0.0092) 
(0.0091) (0.0091) (0.0081) (0.0080) 
Exactly one spouse smokes 0.0118 0.0125 0.0099 0.0099 
(0.0071)* (0.0070)* (0.0063) (0.0063) 
Moved last year 0.0008 0.0005 (0.0016) (0.0012) 
(0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0061) (0.0061) 
Head Married > Once (=1) 0.0150 0.0164 0.0236 0.0234 
(0.0084)* (0.0084)** (0.0072)*** (0.0071)*** 
Same Industry (=1) 0.0086 0.0055 0.0036 0.0039 
(0.0096) (0.0098) (0.0096) (0.0096) 
Husband's Occupation's 
Earnings Variance (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0009) (0.0010) 
(0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0015) (0.0015) 
Wife's Occupation's Earnings 
Variance (0.0028) (0.0038) (0.0046) (0.0038) 
(0.0025) (0.0027) (0.0023)** (0.0025) 
Spouses' Occupations' Earnings 
Covariance (0.0384) (0.0394) (0.0424) (0.0417) 
(0.0209)* (0.0208)* (0.0196)** (0.0193)** 
Unobserved Distance Observed 
Only 
Observed 
Only 
First Full 
Time Probabilistic 
Household-Year Pairs 4141 4141 5211 5213 
Includes Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupation Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log Likelihood -629.43 -622.38 -771.48 -772.6 
Pseudo R Squared 0.1046 0.1146 0.1203 0.1159 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.  This table contains the estimated marginal effects for the covariates in the
divorce model.  Columns 1-4 correspond, respectively, to Table 10 (Columns 1 and 2) and Table 12 
(Columns 1 and 2).  All standard errors are cluster robust. 
92
Appendix B:  Wage Correlation Decomposition 
The de-meaned wages: (𝐵1) 𝑤�𝑖𝑡 ≡ 𝑤𝑖𝑡 − 𝑤�𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 − 𝐸𝑖(𝛼𝑖) + 𝑡 �𝛽𝑖 − 𝐸𝑖(𝛽𝑖)� + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 − 0, 
are expressed as deviations from their time series expectations: (𝐵2) 𝐸𝑡(𝑤�𝑖𝑡) = 𝑎𝑖 − 𝐸𝑖(𝑎𝑖) + 𝐸𝑡(𝑡) �𝛽𝑖 − 𝐸𝑖(𝛽𝑖)� + 0; (𝐵3) ?̇?𝑖𝑡 ≡ 𝑤�𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡(𝑤�𝑖𝑡) = �𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡(𝑡)� �𝛽𝑖 − 𝐸𝑖(𝛽𝑖)� + 𝜀𝑖𝑡. 
Covariance between two occupations (i and j) is defined: (𝐵4) 𝜎𝑖𝑗 ≡ 𝐸𝑡�?̇?𝑖𝑡?̇?𝑗𝑡� = 𝐸𝑡 ��𝑤�𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡(𝑤�𝑖𝑡)�  �𝑤�𝑗𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡�𝑤�𝑗𝑡���. (𝐵5) 𝜎𝑖𝑗 = ?̇?𝑖?̇?𝑗𝜎𝑡2 + 𝐶𝑜𝑣�𝜀𝑖𝑡, 𝜀𝑗𝑡� + 0 + 0, where 
?̇?𝑖 ≡ 𝛽𝑖 − 𝐸
𝑖(𝛽𝑖). 
The only terms that have a non-zero expectation (in B4) are the first two “diagonals”, 
which have the interpretations, respectively, of “correlation in time trends” and 
“correlation in shocks”. 
The occupation-specific time trends are estimated from a random trends model.  
To estimate the occupation-specific trends, I use a method described in Wooldridge 
(2002).  I take the first difference of (B1); this negates the fixed effect, “alpha i”, but the 
trend (𝛽𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽𝑖(𝑡 − 1) = 𝛽𝑖) is now a fixed effect in the differenced model.  I then 
estimate “beta i” using a fixed effects regression of change in average earnings on the 
transformed year-fixed effects.  Using Wooldridge’s notation, these are xi subscript t: (B6) ∆𝑤𝑖𝑡 = ξ𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖 + Δε𝑖𝑡, 
where the deltas represent first differences.  The fixed component of the residuals can 
then be estimated by fitting the model, and these are the occupation-specific time trend 
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estimates.1  The time trend component of earnings correlation is the product of the two 
occupations’ time trends (expressed as deviations from the mean) times a positive 
constant reflecting the length of the time series.  This component is positive if both 
occupations’ earnings trend faster than average or both trend slower than average and are 
negative otherwise. 
1 This method is equivalent to (cross-sectionally) de-meaning the observations and regressing de-meaned 
earnings on time. 
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Appendix C:  Earnings Correlation Model with Single Dimension Distances 
Table C1:  Estimates from regression of earnings correlation on single dimension distances. 
Distance Measure 
Log of 
Transformed 
Earnings 
Correlation, 
Occupations i 
and j 
Correlation of 
Earnings 
Occupations i 
and j 
Earnings 
Correlation 
Originating 
from Time 
Trends 
Earnings 
Correlation 
Originating 
from Shocks 
Arm-Hand Steadiness 0.1878 0.0799 0.0945 -0.0146 
(0.0515)*** (0.0228)*** (0.0253)*** (0.0195) 
Auditory Attention -0.0271 -0.017 0.0083 -0.0252 
(0.0346) (0.0153) (0.0170) (0.0131)* 
Category Flexibility -0.0954 -0.0389 -0.0471 0.0082 
(0.0376)** (0.0167)** (0.0184)** (0.0143) 
Control Precision -0.2214 -0.0942 -0.0557 -0.0385 
(0.0598)*** (0.0265)*** (0.0294)* (0.0227)* 
Deductive Reasoning -0.2234 -0.1072 -0.1181 0.0109 
(0.0758)*** (0.0336)*** (0.0372)*** (0.0287) 
Depth Perception 0.0253 0.0132 0.0138 -0.0006 
(0.0490) (0.0217) (0.0240) (0.0186) 
Dynamic Flexibility 0.1586 0.0681 0.0498 0.0182 
(0.0285)*** (0.0126)*** (0.0140)*** (0.0108)* 
Dynamic Strength 0.2354 0.1103 0.1119 -0.0016 
(0.0673)*** (0.0299)*** (0.0331)*** (0.0255) 
Explosive Strength -0.1573 -0.0658 -0.0892 0.0234 
(0.0264)*** (0.0117)*** (0.0129)*** (0.0100)** 
Extent Flexibility 0.0045 0.0022 -0.0192 0.0215 
(0.0582) (0.0258) (0.0286) (0.0221) 
Far Vision -0.0449 -0.0211 -0.0154 -0.0057 
(0.0253)* (0.0112)* (0.0124) (0.0096) 
Finger Dexterity -0.1841 -0.0836 -0.0825 -0.0011 
(0.0404)*** (0.0179)*** (0.0198)*** (0.0153) 
Flexibility of Closure 0.0239 0.0115 -0.0021 0.0136 
(0.0311) (0.0138) (0.0152) (0.0118) 
Fluency of Ideas -0.0313 -0.0196 0.0328 -0.0523 
(0.0696) (0.0309) (0.0342) (0.0264)** 
Glare Sensitivity -0.3457 -0.1445 -0.1485 0.004 
(0.0476)*** (0.0211)*** (0.0234)*** (0.0181) 
Gross Body Coordination -0.0507 -0.0281 -0.0454 0.0173 
(0.0691) (0.0306) (0.0339) (0.0262) 
Gross Body Equilibrium 0.086 0.0331 0.0361 -0.0031 
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  (0.0472)* (0.0209) (0.0232) (0.0179) 
Hearing Sensitivity 0.1733 0.0772 0.0634 0.0139 
  (0.0370)*** (0.0164)*** (0.0182)*** (0.0141) 
Inductive Reasoning 0.4404 0.1946 0.1638 0.0308 
  (0.0669)*** (0.0297)*** (0.0329)*** (0.0254) 
Information Ordering 0.1181 0.052 0.048 0.0041 
  (0.0432)*** (0.0192)*** (0.0212)** (0.0164) 
Manual Dexterity 0.212 0.0969 0.065 0.0319 
  (0.0588)*** (0.0261)*** (0.0289)** (0.0223) 
Mathematical Reasoning -0.1719 -0.0819 -0.0802 -0.0017 
  (0.0588)*** (0.0261)*** (0.0289)*** (0.0223) 
Memorization 0.0245 0.0096 0.009 0.0006 
  (0.0334) (0.0148) (0.0164) (0.0127) 
Multilimb Coordination 0.1787 0.0734 0.0877 -0.0143 
  (0.0647)*** (0.0287)** (0.0318)*** (0.0245) 
Near Vision -0.0334 -0.0182 -0.0333 0.0151 
  (0.0287) (0.0127) (0.0141)** (0.0109) 
Night Vision 0.221 0.0975 0.0853 0.0122 
  (0.0536)*** (0.0238)*** (0.0263)*** (0.0203) 
Number Facility -0.0033 0.0019 -0.0228 0.0246 
  (0.0527) (0.0234) (0.0259) (0.0200) 
Oral Comprehension -0.2128 -0.0918 -0.0946 0.0028 
  (0.0615)*** (0.0273)*** (0.0302)*** (0.0233) 
Oral Expression -0.0884 -0.0498 -0.0201 -0.0297 
  (0.0590) (0.0261)* (0.0290) (0.0224) 
Originality -0.0155 0.0044 -0.0231 0.0275 
  (0.0658) (0.0292) (0.0323) (0.0250) 
Perceptual Speed 0.024 0.01 0.0099 0.0001 
  (0.0291) (0.0129) (0.0143) (0.0111) 
Peripheral Vision 0.0736 0.0299 0.035 -0.0051 
  (0.0591) (0.0262) (0.0290) (0.0224) 
Problem Sensitivity -0.1473 -0.0676 -0.0402 -0.0274 
  (0.0454)*** (0.0201)*** (0.0223)* (0.0172) 
Rate Control -0.0796 -0.0371 -0.0456 0.0085 
  (0.0637) (0.0282) (0.0313) (0.0242) 
Reaction Time -0.3516 -0.1564 -0.153 -0.0034 
  (0.0745)*** (0.0330)*** (0.0366)*** (0.0283) 
Response Orientation 0.3226 0.1334 0.1057 0.0277 
  (0.0662)*** (0.0293)*** (0.0325)*** (0.0251) 
Selective Attention 0.0658 0.0315 0.029 0.0025 
  (0.0273)** (0.0121)*** (0.0134)** (0.0104) 
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Sound Localization -0.1723 -0.0731 -0.0797 0.0066 
  (0.0479)*** (0.0212)*** (0.0235)*** (0.0182) 
Spatial Orientation 0.0073 0.0007 0.023 -0.0223 
  (0.0439) (0.0195) (0.0216) (0.0167) 
Speech Clarity 0.078 0.0375 0.0579 -0.0204 
  (0.0472)* (0.0209)* (0.0232)** (0.0179) 
Speech Recognition -0.0358 -0.0158 -0.0552 0.0394 
  (0.0411) (0.0182) (0.0202)*** (0.0156)** 
Speed of Closure -0.0083 -0.0054 0.0025 -0.0079 
  (0.0338) (0.0150) (0.0166) (0.0128) 
Speed of Limb Movement 0.0132 0.0079 0.0163 -0.0084 
  (0.0470) (0.0208) (0.0231) (0.0178) 
Stamina 0.1796 0.0733 0.0956 -0.0222 
  (0.0639)*** (0.0283)*** (0.0314)*** (0.0242) 
Static Strength -0.3381 -0.149 -0.1185 -0.0304 
  (0.0642)*** (0.0285)*** (0.0315)*** (0.0243) 
Time Sharing 0.0538 0.0265 0.024 0.0025 
  (0.0247)** (0.0110)** (0.0121)** (0.0094) 
Trunk Strength 0.0119 0.0076 0.0112 -0.0036 
  (0.0508) (0.0225) (0.0250) (0.0193) 
Visual Color 
Discrimination 0.0503 0.0191 0.0131 0.0059 
  (0.0305)* (0.0135) (0.0150) (0.0116) 
Visualization -0.0337 -0.0146 0.0064 -0.021 
  (0.0331) (0.0147) (0.0163) (0.0126)* 
Wrist-Finger Speed 0.0729 0.0342 0.0342 0 
  (0.0377)* (0.0167)** (0.0185)* (0.0143) 
Written Comprehension 0.0332 0.0193 0.0166 0.0027 
  (0.0739) (0.0328) (0.0363) (0.0281) 
Written Expression -0.1373 -0.0595 -0.0973 0.0378 
  (0.0717)* (0.0318)* (0.0352)*** (0.0272) 
Analyzing Data or 
Information -0.2076 -0.0936 -0.0363 -0.0573 
  (0.0501)*** (0.0222)*** (0.0246) (0.0190)*** 
Assisting and Caring for 
Others -0.0147 -0.0075 -0.02 0.0125 
  (0.0232) (0.0103) (0.0114)* (0.0088) 
Coaching and Developing 
Others 0.047 0.0201 -0.0099 0.03 
  (0.0410) (0.0182) (0.0202) (0.0156)* 
Communicating with 
Persons Outside 0.1163 0.0491 0.0484 0.0007 
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Organization 
  (0.0428)*** (0.0190)*** (0.0210)** (0.0162) 
Communicating with 
Supervisors, Peers, or 
Subordinates -0.0009 -0.0032 -0.0171 0.0139 
  (0.0391) (0.0174) (0.0192) (0.0148) 
Controlling Machines and 
Processes -0.0864 -0.0379 -0.0454 0.0075 
  (0.0468)* (0.0207)* (0.0230)** (0.0177) 
Coordinating the Work 
and Activities of Others 0.0577 0.0242 0.0218 0.0024 
  (0.0387) (0.0171) (0.0190) (0.0147) 
Developing Objectives 
and Strategies 0.1544 0.0681 0.043 0.0251 
  (0.0412)*** (0.0183)*** (0.0203)** (0.0157) 
Developing and Building 
Teams 0.0635 0.0284 0.0436 -0.0151 
  (0.0383)* (0.0170)* (0.0188)** (0.0145) 
Documenting/Recording 
Information -0.0819 -0.0386 -0.043 0.0044 
  (0.0357)** (0.0158)** (0.0175)** (0.0136) 
Drafting, Laying Out, and 
Specifying Technical 
Devices, Parts, and 
Equipment 0.0544 0.0241 0.0101 0.014 
  (0.0343) (0.0152) (0.0169) (0.0130) 
Establishing and 
Maintaining Interpersonal 
Relationships -0.0507 -0.022 -0.0108 -0.0112 
  (0.0362) (0.0161) (0.0178) (0.0137) 
Estimating the 
Quantifiable 
Characteristics of 
Products, Events, or 
Information 0.0321 0.0149 0.0145 0.0004 
  (0.0287) (0.0127) (0.0141) (0.0109) 
Evaluating Information to 
Determine Compliance 
with Standards -0.0449 -0.0186 -0.023 0.0043 
  (0.0318) (0.0141) (0.0156) (0.0121) 
Getting Information -0.0703 -0.0306 -0.0432 0.0126 
  (0.0383)* (0.0170)* (0.0188)** (0.0145) 
Guiding, Directing, and 
Motivating Subordinates -0.2295 -0.1078 -0.079 -0.0288 
98
  (0.0409)*** (0.0182)*** (0.0201)*** (0.0155)* 
Handling and Moving 
Objects -0.1124 -0.0385 -0.0673 0.0287 
  (0.0455)** (0.0202)* (0.0223)*** (0.0173)* 
Identifying Objects, 
Actions, and Events -0.0093 -0.0047 -0.006 0.0013 
  (0.0311) (0.0138) (0.0153) (0.0118) 
Inspecting Equipment, 
Structures, or Material -0.09 -0.0458 -0.0609 0.0152 
  (0.0369)** (0.0164)*** (0.0181)*** (0.0140) 
Interacting With 
Computers 0.1244 0.0578 0.0385 0.0193 
  (0.0417)*** (0.0185)*** (0.0205)* (0.0158) 
Interpreting the Meaning 
of Information for Others -0.1352 -0.0603 -0.0439 -0.0164 
  (0.0417)*** (0.0185)*** (0.0205)** (0.0158) 
Judging the Qualities of 
Things, Services, or 
People -0.0257 -0.0113 0.0075 -0.0188 
  (0.0300) (0.0133) (0.0147) (0.0114)* 
Making Decisions and 
Solving Problems 0.0121 0.0017 -0.0153 0.017 
  (0.0421) (0.0187) (0.0207) (0.0160) 
Monitor Processes, 
Materials, or Surroundings -0.0603 -0.028 -0.0313 0.0033 
  (0.0288)** (0.0128)** (0.0142)** (0.0109) 
Monitoring and 
Controlling Resources 0.0523 0.023 0.0101 0.0129 
  (0.0331) (0.0147) (0.0163) (0.0126) 
Operating Vehicles, 
Mechanized Devices, or 
Equipment -0.3087 -0.1395 -0.138 -0.0015 
  (0.0446)*** (0.0198)*** (0.0219)*** (0.0169) 
Organizing, Planning, and 
Prioritizing Work 0.008 0.0031 0.0052 -0.0021 
  (0.0424) (0.0188) (0.0208) (0.0161) 
Performing 
Administrative Activities -0.137 -0.0617 -0.0358 -0.0259 
  (0.0372)*** (0.0165)*** (0.0182)** (0.0141)* 
Performing General 
Physical Activities -0.1066 -0.0455 -0.0111 -0.0343 
  (0.0512)** (0.0227)** (0.0251) (0.0194)* 
Performing for or 
Working Directly with the 0.0178 0.0035 -0.0115 0.015 
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Public 
  (0.0286) (0.0127) (0.0140) (0.0108) 
Processing Information 0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0124 0.0123 
  (0.0451) (0.0200) (0.0221) (0.0171) 
Provide Consultation and 
Advice to Others -0.0937 -0.039 -0.0348 -0.0043 
  (0.0412)** (0.0183)** (0.0203)* (0.0156) 
Repairing and Maintaining 
Electronic Equipment -0.1102 -0.0451 -0.0551 0.0101 
  (0.0340)*** (0.0151)*** (0.0167)*** (0.0129) 
Repairing and Maintaining 
Mechanical Equipment 0.1024 0.0358 0.0588 -0.023 
  (0.0516)** (0.0229) (0.0254)** (0.0196) 
Resolving Conflicts and 
Negotiating with Others 0.0949 0.0445 0.042 0.0026 
  (0.0386)** (0.0171)*** (0.0189)** (0.0146) 
Scheduling Work and 
Activities 0.1154 0.0511 0.0304 0.0207 
  (0.0403)*** (0.0179)*** (0.0198) (0.0153) 
Selling or Influencing 
Others -0.0569 -0.0236 -0.0214 -0.0022 
  (0.0331)* (0.0147) (0.0162) (0.0126) 
Staffing Organizational 
Units 0.1279 0.0601 0.0346 0.0255 
  (0.0337)*** (0.0149)*** (0.0165)** (0.0128)** 
Thinking Creatively -0.1287 -0.0574 -0.0498 -0.0076 
  (0.0384)*** (0.0170)*** (0.0189)*** (0.0146) 
Training and Teaching 
Others 0.0523 0.0279 0.0423 -0.0144 
  (0.0370) (0.0164)* (0.0182)** (0.0140) 
Updating and Using 
Relevant Knowledge 0.0961 0.0484 0.0266 0.0218 
  (0.0430)** (0.0191)** (0.0211) (0.0163) 
Active Learning 0.2815 0.1238 0.1576 -0.0339 
  (0.0636)*** (0.0282)*** (0.0312)*** (0.0241) 
Active Listening -0.0496 -0.0225 -0.013 -0.0095 
  (0.0652) (0.0289) (0.0320) (0.0247) 
Complex Problem Solving -0.153 -0.0653 -0.0313 -0.034 
  (0.0569)*** (0.0252)*** (0.0279) (0.0216) 
Coordination -0.0163 -0.0071 -0.0278 0.0207 
  (0.0362) (0.0161) (0.0178) (0.0137) 
Critical Thinking 0.174 0.0806 0.0376 0.043 
  (0.0598)*** (0.0265)*** (0.0294) (0.0227)* 
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Equipment Maintenance 0.1852 0.0814 0.0808 0.0006 
  (0.0618)*** (0.0274)*** (0.0303)*** (0.0234) 
Equipment Selection 0.0903 0.0489 0.0577 -0.0088 
  (0.0440)** (0.0195)** (0.0216)*** (0.0167) 
Installation -0.4675 -0.2083 -0.2084 0.0001 
  (0.0302)*** (0.0134)*** (0.0148)*** (0.0115) 
Instructing 0.035 0.0147 0.031 -0.0163 
  (0.0525) (0.0233) (0.0258) (0.0199) 
Judgment and Decision 
Making 0.0508 0.0249 -0.0103 0.0351 
  (0.0591) (0.0262) (0.0290) (0.0224) 
Learning Strategies 0.0743 0.0307 0.0446 -0.0139 
  (0.0549) (0.0243) (0.0270)* (0.0208) 
Management of Financial 
Resources -0.0417 -0.0225 -0.0338 0.0113 
  (0.0372) (0.0165) (0.0183)* (0.0141) 
Management of Material 
Resources -0.0181 -0.0059 -0.0014 -0.0045 
  (0.0365) (0.0162) (0.0179) (0.0138) 
Management of Personnel 
Resources 0.058 0.0272 0.0197 0.0074 
  (0.0461) (0.0204) (0.0226) (0.0175) 
Mathematics 0.0624 0.0305 0.0506 -0.0201 
  (0.0449) (0.0199) (0.0221)** (0.0171) 
Monitoring -0.1051 -0.042 -0.0615 0.0194 
  (0.0458)** (0.0203)** (0.0225)*** (0.0174) 
Negotiation 0.0615 0.0203 0.0258 -0.0055 
  (0.0502) (0.0222) (0.0246) (0.0190) 
Operation Monitoring -0.025 -0.0067 -0.0112 0.0045 
  (0.0539) (0.0239) (0.0265) (0.0204) 
Operation and Control 0.3522 0.1599 0.1479 0.0121 
  (0.0574)*** (0.0255)*** (0.0282)*** (0.0218) 
Operations Analysis -0.0909 -0.0405 -0.0588 0.0183 
  (0.0314)*** (0.0139)*** (0.0154)*** (0.0119) 
Persuasion -0.0548 -0.0228 -0.0196 -0.0032 
  (0.0497) (0.0220) (0.0244) (0.0189) 
Programming -0.0318 -0.0134 -0.0141 0.0007 
  (0.0302) (0.0134) (0.0148) (0.0115) 
Quality Control Analysis 0.119 0.0526 0.0356 0.017 
  (0.0415)*** (0.0184)*** (0.0204)* (0.0157) 
Reading Comprehension 0.0724 0.0316 0.0031 0.0285 
  (0.0742) (0.0329) (0.0364) (0.0281) 
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Repairing -0.0736 -0.0383 0.0121 -0.0505 
  (0.0621) (0.0275) (0.0305) (0.0235)** 
Science -0.0585 -0.0286 0.0261 -0.0547 
  (0.0313)* (0.0139)** (0.0154)* (0.0119)*** 
Service Orientation -0.4694 -0.213 -0.2369 0.0238 
  (0.0388)*** (0.0172)*** (0.0190)*** (0.0147) 
Social Perceptiveness 0.0004 -0.0015 0.0428 -0.0443 
  (0.0444) (0.0197) (0.0218)** (0.0168)*** 
Speaking 0.2083 0.0925 0.0893 0.0032 
  (0.0697)*** (0.0309)*** (0.0342)*** (0.0264) 
Systems Analysis 0.0141 0.0003 0.0417 -0.0414 
  (0.0629) (0.0279) (0.0309) (0.0239)* 
Systems Evaluation 0.0892 0.0442 0.012 0.0322 
  (0.0654) (0.0290) (0.0321) (0.0248) 
Technology Design 0.1519 0.0669 0.0636 0.0034 
  (0.0279)*** (0.0124)*** (0.0137)*** (0.0106) 
Time Management -0.0434 -0.018 0.0414 -0.0594 
  (0.0480) (0.0213) (0.0236)* (0.0182)*** 
Troubleshooting -0.1415 -0.0578 -0.0619 0.004 
  (0.0548)*** (0.0243)** (0.0269)** (0.0208) 
Writing -0.15 -0.0649 -0.0499 -0.015 
  (0.0733)** (0.0325)** (0.0360) (0.0278) 
Administration and 
Management -0.0492 -0.0233 -0.0348 0.0114 
  (0.0361) (0.0160) (0.0177)** (0.0137) 
Biology -0.174 -0.0797 -0.0817 0.002 
  (0.0264)*** (0.0117)*** (0.0129)*** (0.0100) 
Building and Construction 0.2068 0.0958 0.0912 0.0046 
  (0.0294)*** (0.0130)*** (0.0144)*** (0.0112) 
Chemistry 0.0341 0.0179 0.0317 -0.0138 
  (0.0286) (0.0127) (0.0140)** (0.0109) 
Clerical 0.0441 0.0187 0.0101 0.0086 
  (0.0349) (0.0155) (0.0171) (0.0132) 
Communications and 
Media -0.1414 -0.0626 -0.0625 -0.0002 
  (0.0390)*** (0.0173)*** (0.0191)*** (0.0148) 
Computers and 
Electronics 0.0425 0.0227 0.0559 -0.0332 
  (0.0425) (0.0188) (0.0209)*** (0.0161)** 
Customer and Personal 
Service 0.1028 0.0475 0.0952 -0.0476 
  (0.0322)*** (0.0143)*** (0.0158)*** (0.0122)*** 
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Design -0.1697 -0.0787 -0.0738 -0.005 
  (0.0376)*** (0.0167)*** (0.0185)*** (0.0143) 
Economics and 
Accounting -0.1275 -0.0557 -0.0462 -0.0095 
  (0.0306)*** (0.0136)*** (0.0151)*** (0.0116) 
Education and Training 0.0562 0.0254 -0.0025 0.0279 
  (0.0340)* (0.0151)* (0.0167) (0.0129)** 
Engineering and 
Technology -0.0047 -0.0054 0.0003 -0.0057 
  (0.0417) (0.0185) (0.0205) (0.0158) 
English Language -0.0619 -0.027 -0.0374 0.0105 
  (0.0405) (0.0180) (0.0199)* (0.0154) 
Fine Arts 0.0306 0.0128 0.0111 0.0017 
  (0.0222) (0.0098) (0.0109) (0.0084) 
Food Production -0.0024 -0.0021 0.0109 -0.0129 
  (0.0212) (0.0094) (0.0104) (0.0080) 
Foreign Language 0.0664 0.0318 0.0332 -0.0014 
  (0.0244)*** (0.0108)*** (0.0120)*** (0.0093) 
Geography 0.1351 0.0629 0.0503 0.0126 
  (0.0301)*** (0.0133)*** (0.0148)*** (0.0114) 
History and Archeology -0.033 -0.0142 -0.0321 0.0179 
  (0.0278) (0.0123) (0.0136)** (0.0105)* 
Law and Government -0.0108 -0.0045 0.0198 -0.0243 
  (0.0336) (0.0149) (0.0165) (0.0128)* 
Mathematics 0.0466 0.0197 0.0163 0.0034 
  (0.0321) (0.0142) (0.0158) (0.0122) 
Mechanical -0.2357 -0.1017 -0.127 0.0253 
  (0.0453)*** (0.0201)*** (0.0223)*** (0.0172) 
Medicine and Dentistry -0.0145 -0.0066 -0.0021 -0.0045 
  (0.0245) (0.0109) (0.0120) (0.0093) 
Personnel and Human 
Resources 0.0721 0.0338 0.0215 0.0123 
  (0.0334)** (0.0148)** (0.0164) (0.0127) 
Philosophy and Theology 0.0379 0.0148 0.034 -0.0192 
  (0.0326) (0.0144) (0.0160)** (0.0124) 
Physics 0.0764 0.0343 0.0197 0.0146 
  (0.0342)** (0.0152)** (0.0168) (0.0130) 
Production and Processing -0.0771 -0.0373 -0.0012 -0.0361 
  (0.0255)*** (0.0113)*** (0.0125) (0.0097)*** 
Psychology -0.0934 -0.0386 -0.0495 0.0109 
  (0.0363)** (0.0161)** (0.0178)*** (0.0138) 
Public Safety and Security -0.0802 -0.0358 -0.0169 -0.0189 
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  (0.0262)*** (0.0116)*** (0.0128) (0.0099)* 
Sales and Marketing 0.0003 -0.0006 -0.0008 0.0002 
  (0.0296) (0.0131) (0.0145) (0.0112) 
Sociology and 
Anthropology 0.0728 0.0308 0.0272 0.0036 
  (0.0359)** (0.0159)* (0.0176) (0.0136) 
Telecommunications 0.0567 0.0242 0.0219 0.0023 
  (0.0255)** (0.0113)** (0.0125)* (0.0097) 
Therapy and Counseling 0.003 0.001 0.0023 -0.0013 
  (0.0313) (0.0139) (0.0154) (0.0119) 
Transportation -0.0868 -0.0404 -0.052 0.0116 
  (0.0255)*** (0.0113)*** (0.0125)*** (0.0097) 
Industry Employment 
Shares 0.1185 0.0493 0.0017 0.0477 
  (0.0696)* (0.0309) (0.0342) (0.0264)* 
Industry Shares Squared -0.4814 -0.2099 -0.1348 -0.0751 
  (0.1700)*** (0.0754)*** (0.0835) (0.0645) 
Occupation Shares Across 
Industries -0.1835 -0.0818 -0.0798 -0.002 
  (0.0398)*** (0.0176)*** (0.0195)*** (0.0151) 
Occupation Shares 
Squared 0.0888 0.04 0.0396 0.0003 
  (0.0268)*** (0.0119)*** (0.0132)*** (0.0102) 
Constant 0.2789 0.1261 0.117 0.0092 
  (0.0159)*** (0.0071)*** (0.0078)*** (0.0060) 
R Squared 0.05 0.05 0.04 <0.01 
Sample Size 70,876 70,876 70,876 70,876 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 
104
CURRICULUM VITAE 
Benjamin Van Kammen 
Place of birth:  Milwaukee, WI 
Education 
B.A., University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, December 2007 
Majors:  Economics and History 
Ph.D., University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, August 2013 
Dissertation Title:  “Three Essays in Labor Economics” 
Presentations 
“Employment Effects of Paid Sick Leave Mandates.” 
Midwest Economics Association (MEA) meetings, 2012. 
UW-Milwaukee Economics Seminar Series, 2011. 
 “Occupation Proximity and Marital Stability.” 
Midwest Economics Association (MEA) meetings, 2013. 
Teaching 
Econ 103:  Principles of Microeconomics 
Econ 210:  Economic Statistics  
Econ 301:  Intermediate Microeconomics 
Econ 415:  Economics of Employment and Labor Relations 
Econ 447:  Labor Economics 
Honors and Awards 
Richard Perlman Paper Prize in Labor Economics, 2012. 
Organizational Memberships and Service 
American Economic Association 2010-Present 
Midwest Economic Association 2011-Present 
Chair and Discussant, MEA Meetings, 2012-2013. 
Society of Labor Economists 2012-Present 
105
